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 Within the past two decades or so, the South American region has seen a 
remarkable rise in the enactment of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) 
rights-affirming policies. This trend is particularly notable given the dearth of such 
progress in the rest of the developing world. As such, this study aims to contribute to the 
small but rapidly growing body of literature on the subject. In particular, I aim to 
determine which factors are most explanatory of when and why countries will enact 
LGBT rights policies and why a disparity exists across the region. The first systematic 
study of its kind, findings suggest that social movements, the language of a state's 
constitution, and religious trends are most influential in this regard. Noting the limitations 
of the research, I proceed to suggest possible future research directions. 
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CHAPTER I 
CLARIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Within the past decade or so, a conspicuous shift in social policy has swept across 
the South American region in which policies aimed at promoting lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender (LGBT) rights are rapidly approaching the norm. This is a notable trend 
in part because most of the rest of the developing world continues to prove an 
overwhelmingly hostile environment for LGBT persons while virtually all progress has 
occurred in Europe and North America. Furthermore, the South American region serves 
as the center of gravity for the Catholic Church, which remains unambiguously opposed 
to most policy that explicitly recognizes or provides protective status for LGBT persons. 
As such, this trend appears counterintuitive on its face, and suggests that a unique blend 
of factors must be at work in order for this kind of rapid advancement to occur. 
 The purpose of this project is first and foremost to discern which factors are most 
pertinent to the expansion of LGBT rights so as to glean lessons for future efforts. In 
addition, this should serve as a contribution to a still fledgling body of literature on 
LGBT rights in South America specifically – literature that shows little more than a 
speculative, journalistic account of the phenomenon. In an effort to explore these 
developments more in-depth, I intend to employ a more robust and systematic  
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hypothesis-testing procedure in an effort to shed more light on why the policies in 
question have moved forward in the times and places that they have, thereby paving the 
way both for future efforts in other countries or for related efforts within the same 
countries. In an effort to determine these factors, we will have to assess those via the 
relevant literature - institutional, socioeconomic, social movements, socioeconomic, and 
international norms. In order better highlight how these factors have influenced changes 
in LGBT rights policy; we will examine the pertinent factors within each country in 
South America. This allows for an effective controlling of such baseline factors as 
religion, language, culture, and to a great extent, institutional frameworks. Before 
proceeding, we need to understand that the development of LGBT rights has not been 
uniform across the continent to date. As such, every effort possible should be made to 
determine the relevant control variables, followed by which of those variables are most 
pertinent to the question at hand. 
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CHAPTER II  
BROAD THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Preface 
 By and large, the central focus of human rights over the past three or four 
centuries has shifted away from nations or other collectivities and increasingly toward the 
individual. In order to discern common lessons that may be applied to any one subset of 
rights; it is paramount that one examines the broader framework of human rights and its 
progression in different frames and environs. In this section, in an attempt to understand  
how LGBT rights can be expected to progress, we will discern some common 
mechanisms by which rights have been achieved and sustained more generally. This 
should be instructive when attempting to examine the expansion of such rights in any 
particular region, and is crucial when determining which factors to hold  
constant in such an analysis. 
There is a variety of interconnecting factors – some of which are largely unique to 
Latin America, and some of which are unique to the formulation of LGBT rights on the 
whole – which coalesce to form a very unique situation on the ground when it comes to 
the establishment of LGBT rights within this particular region.  Javier Corrales (2014) 
speculates that the usual correlation between national income and respect for LGBT and  
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other civil rights has defied expectations unlike any other country or region to date. 
Rather, a better predictor in this case is the strength of ties between social movements and 
political parties with substantial power in a legislature, with Corrales pointing to the 
willingness of LGBT rights groups to work with the then governing center-right party to 
craft what became a successful hate crimes law. In addition, Corrales points to the 
separation of church and state as a vital component in success for LGBT initiatives, with 
Catholic and sometimes Protestant organizations serving as the chief roadblocks to 
reform. Elizabeth J. Friedman (2014) emphasizes the importance of rapidly developing 
international norms concerning human rights, and the role that such a phenomenon plays 
in a region which was plagued by decades of military dictatorships and saw a human 
rights discourse develop in response to it. For one, she notes that “shrewd street activists” 
emerged to form increasingly sophisticated lobbying apparatuses which became highly 
influential in left-wing politics by the 1990s (2014). In addition, activists from Spain 
have provided advice and material resources to activists across Latin America, including 
Mexico and particularly Argentina.  
Within the judicial realm, a number of concurrent developments have taken place that 
have worked to the benefit of several LGBT rights causes. Interestingly, Omar Encarnación 
(2014) observes that the 1967 U.S. Supreme Court decision Loving v. Virginia has set the 
stage for a number of court decisions in countries such as Brazil, Mexico and, Colombia. 
Furthermore, because marriage in most of Latin America is a strictly civil institution in 
contrast with the religious understanding of marriage in the U.S., there is less legal 
precedent by which judges might justify rulings detrimental to same-sex unions. Finally, 
Daniel de la Cruz (2013) has written what is quite possibly the widest-reaching analysis of 
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LGBT rights in Latin America to date, and the hypotheses that his study formulates will 
largely albeit not entirely coincide with those developed for this study. In essence, the 
effects of language in a national constitution, the limitations of the courts, the influence of 
and barriers before LGBT rights groups, and the specific nature of the religious opponents 
to reform all play key roles in the development of LGBT rights across the region.  
Following these initial observations, I shall lay out some brief context for the 
development of civil rights in general, followed by further exploration of how these norms 
tend to play out in the modern era. It will then be prudent to establish the full scope of 
what the study intends to cover with respect to LGBT rights, and what specifically that 
concept entails. 
 
Some Historical Context on the Expansion of Rights Generally 
The development of civil rights for previously excluded groups has developed 
from a centuries-long process of development in the conception of human rights. People 
have moved from being seen as subjects of a monarch to citizens of a sovereign state 
endowed with natural rights, though not everyone (women, minorities, etc.) was 
immediately entitled to these rights when first codified in such documents as The Two 
Treatises of Government or the United States Constitution. Various minorities and long-
stigmatized groups have struggled and continue to struggle for full inclusion, either by 
disenfranchisement within the political process or by failures on the part of the state to 
protect the rights of such groups from what Thomas Jefferson often dubbed the tyranny 
of the majority. The women’s suffrage and African American civil rights movements in 
the U.S. are among the most vivid examples of this. Rights, by and large, are effectively 
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meaningless absent consistent enforcement on the part of the state. Thus, it is necessary 
to assess the behaviors and incentives driving states in order to discern the likelihood that 
certain rights will be respected. 
 With respect to state actors, Michael Haas (2014) outlines a thesis in which: (1) 
Legal norms establish the minimally accepted boundaries of rights; (2) State institutions 
persist in monitoring and enforcing these rights; and (3) External pressure groups keep 
the state in check both in terms of preventing abuses and facilitating protection. In effect, 
this mechanism consists of a set of checks and balances wherein pressure groups both  
internal and external press for greater protections of human rights, often by way of 
specialized single-issue interest groups. Once the state establishes these protections, often 
through an ombudsman office or other specialized agencies, pressure to maintain a new 
status quo is applied to the state so as to ensure that these protections do not flag. A 
larger-picture historical process leading up to this norm is outlined by Christian Reus-
Smit (2011). In essence, his thesis postulates that tipping points or punctuated equilibria 
can be seen throughout history – the Westphalian settlement of the late 17th century, the 
wave of independence across Latin America in the early 19th century, and the post-1945 
wave of independence across former European colonies in the developing world cited as 
prominent examples. This series of events is ultimately dubbed by Reus-Smit as the 
“generative paradox of rights and sovereign states” (p. 237). The paradox from this stems 
from the fact that although historical struggles for individual rights have historically 
rallied around nationalism and demands for state sovereignty from empire, the sovereign 
states that result from these pushes are themselves often failed guarantors of the rights 
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that were sought. This has been demonstrated at least in part by the eruption of civil wars 
in much of Africa and Asia after the British and French Empires relinquished much of 
their power in those regions following the Second World War. One interpretation of this 
which would fit into a broader examination of how the conception of human rights has 
developed over the centuries is that the locus of agency has shifted from national 
sovereignty and toward the plight of individuals within these sovereign territories.  
Thus, when determining what propels the development of LGBT rights in South 
America as well as the disparities seen in the process thereof, among the most crucial 
factors to analyze is the incentive structure of the states in question. Furthermore, genuine 
protection of any kind of rights cannot be accomplished through a one-off action, but 
rather through a sustained commitment and a shift in human rights norms. Additionally, it 
is worth noting that the international community has grown exponentially more important 
in introducing as well as reinforcing human rights in much of the developing world. 
Uganda, for instance, has received a great deal of pushback in response to its 
controversial 2014 law punishing sodomy by imposing life imprisonment (Escobedo, 
2014). Such a shift in the enforcement of global norms is a relatively recent phenomenon 
that should be explored briefly in the context of this project.     
 
The Globalization of Civil and Human Rights 
The boomerang effect, in the context of international human rights, describes a 
situation in which a domestic human rights group sends out a call – a boomerang – to the 
international community for aid to counter any repressive tactics employed by the state. 
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In the event that an international human rights organization (HRO) responds with 
material resources and/or personnel to aid their domestic counterparts in a relatively 
repressive country, the state can be targeted “from below” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Brysk, 
2003; Sikkink, 2008; Murdie & Davis, 2012; Holzhacker, 2013). The overarching thesis 
is that the boomerang phenomenon has in large part proven responsible for the more 
recent gains in human rights practices in most of the developing world. Following this, 
particularly after sections of the local population has been educated on a given matter and 
then mobilized; they often seek aid from more influential states so as to lead to pressure 
from above. Building on this model, Risse and Sikkink (1999) outline a “spiral” model in 
which states move from repression to fully internalized respect for human rights norms. 
This typically begins in the form tactical concessions in response to shaming and other 
pressures from the international community. As long as such pressure is maintained, the 
state in question will continue to concede repressive behaviors in lieu of attempting to 
evade them, leading to habituation and eventual internalization. The last stage generally 
occurs when heads of state and government as well as legislators and public 
administrators integrate rights-respecting functions into how their positions are executed.   
A rapidly building body of literature examining the boomerang effect on related 
phenomena has come to define how human rights are introduced and sustained in 
otherwise uncooperative countries (Brysk, 1993; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Lutz & Sikkink, 
2000; Brown, 2002; Sikkink, 2008; Koo & Ramirez, 2009). Koo and Ramirez (2009) 
found that the neo-realist perspective largely fails to predict the advancement of rights 
specifically via the establishment of ombudsman offices and human rights treaty 
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ratifications. Standard state-level variables such as GDP, developed vs. developing, 
democratic transition, and human rights records are less important than the growing 
saturation of the world with human rights norms, hosting global human rights 
conferences, and linking to the global polity. Such findings appear on the surface to 
corroborate the overarching notion that human rights in the post-Cold War world are 
bound more than ever to transnational global norms. Thus, either states do not act solely 
out of self-preservation, or acts of self-preservation themselves include public recognition 
of human rights norms on less tangible level. Lutz and Sikkink note that the global 
democracy wave of the 1980s has effectively realized much of that rights discourse 
throughout the region, particularly in light of the formation of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and its charter prohibiting human rights abuses that were 
widespread until democratization. Examining the observed incidences of torture, forced 
disappearance, and non-democracy, all three incident types went from “very high” 
occurrences to medium (in the case of torture) and low (for the other two) from the late 
1970s to the mid-1990s (p. 638). OAS captured the primordial human rights groups built 
upon an emergent discourse of human rights with respect to forced disappearances and 
children’s rights, along with the aid of the foreign policy priorities of the Carter 
administration, led to a cascade that built enough momentum to withstand the reversal of 
fortune brought on by the Reagan administration and resurgent Cold War ideology. 
Argentina, in particular, has been focused on for this purpose (Brysk, 1993; Sikkink, 
2008), with the same general theme of domestic, grassroots human rights actors receiving 
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substantive aid from more equipped states and international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs). 
 The subset of literature on the expansion of rights in the post-War world strongly 
suggests that some manner of increasingly interconnected politics and discourse diffusing 
across traditional state boundaries is more important than ever before. The boomerang 
effect and spiral model, after outlining the rapid development of Argentina as a liberal 
democracy emerging from pariah state status, rest on the assumption that global human 
rights norms themselves can and do lead to direct pressure on the part of intransigent 
states. This stands in contrast to the long-held realist assumption of states acting in a 
strictly rational fashion, responding to economic incentives and attempting to self-
preserve. Because there is little evidence that the countries in Latin America which have 
so far shown the most progress in respecting and protecting LGBT rights did so out of 
such concerns, another explanation must be given. I thereby hypothesize in part that these 
countries have responded to less material pressures, more in line with the boomerang and 
spiral models than anything else.  
 Some academic work explaining the progression of LGBT rights in Latin 
America has already been conducted, though it is limited relative to that which has been 
conducted for much of the developed world, particularly the U.S. Thus far we have seen 
full same-sex marriage achieved legislatively in Argentina, judicially in Brazil, along 
with wide disparities across the rest of the continent with respect to LGBT rights 
indicators. Same-sex marriage along with anti-discrimination measures have been 
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enacted legislatively and presidentially approved in Uruguay, while a continuing 
disparity in the age of consent exists in Paraguay. 
 
Defining LGBT Rights: Beyond a Single, Concrete Policy 
The purpose of this project is to determine which variables are most relevant to 
bringing forth rights for lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgender (LGBT) individuals in 
regions of the world that are generally considered to be outside the realm of developed 
countries. In light of the fact that, on a regional basis, the most substantial progress seen 
for LGBT rights thus far outside the developed world is in Latin America. This having 
been said, there is nevertheless a conspicuous disparity throughout the region. Due to the  
relative homogeneity of culture, religion, economic indicators, institutional structure, and 
levels of democracy – the usual baseline variables toward which an analyst would turn 
before examining anything more subtle or complex – there are evidently other factors at 
play. With respect to the development of a systematic and rigorous analysis of the 
phenomenon, the ability to effectively hold the aforementioned variables constant will 
allow us to develop a comparative framework through which we may test the relevant  
hypotheses.  Thus, while the enactment of policies is one matter, but the Latin American 
region has less disparity today in another crucially important realm than in that of LGBT 
policy success – rampant discrimination and even violence of LGBT people. The aim 
here is to illustrate that it is not necessarily the case that state behavior with respect to 
human rights matters mirrors or follows the attitudes of society at large. This is an 
important factor in the study in that it shows why alternative variables, e.g. international 
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norm diffusion or pressure from NGOs and other interest groups, must play a substantial 
role in the progress seen on the policy front in those countries that have seen it so far. 
On the Social-Legal Disparity in General 
 A host of examples in recent world history point to a bidirectional process of civil 
rights expansions. Among the most notable may be the American Civil Rights movement 
of the 1950s and ‘60s which sought to end racial segregation in the South. Although the 
landmark decision Brown v. Board of Education occurred in 1954, segregation remained 
throughout the South in defiance of the ruling, courtesy of a well-entrenched status quo  
which had grown accustomed to segregated facilities and services. Although African  
Americans were now legally protected on the federal level, state and local governments 
became resistant to the point of requiring President Eisenhower to send the National 
Guard to Little Rock, Arkansas to oversee a safe desegregation of their public schools. 
Among the most notorious instances of violence directed towards civil rights protesters 
occurred in Birmingham, Alabama in 1963, wherein police cracked down on marchers by 
pummeling them with night sticks and high-pressure fire hoses. Such laws as the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968, the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, affirmative action, and 
school busing arrangements in most major metropolitan areas in the late 1960s and ‘70s 
were all policy goals that were hardly even conceivable as late as the 1950s. Nonetheless, 
the growing discontent on the part of minorities in being effectively barred from sharing  
in post-WWII prosperity combined with such effective and charismatic leaders as Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Bayard Rustin, and Andrew Young propelled the legal recognition of  
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equality past what society was ready to accept. The aforementioned laws passed in the 
movement’s wake, however, were swiftly met with all manner of backlash ranging from 
violence directed at civil rights volunteers and lynchings to much more subtle forms of 
protests such as enrolling children in private schools and redlining. In short, those 
favoring the racial status quo took significant strides to preserve the privilege that they 
enjoyed during the pre-Civil Rights era.  
 While this parallel is instructive in examining other civil rights causes, including  
those pushing for LGBT rights specifically, there are some notable distinctions that need  
to be drawn. For one, race is clearly visible and cannot be concealed or hidden, whereas 
sexuality can be selectively concealed by staying in “the closet.” Relating to this, the 
assumption about homosexual activity for centuries and across cultures has been that it 
stems not from an innate characteristic, but from a primal desire that resides in everyone 
and is to be suppressed. As such, the concept of LGBT rights as a form of civil rights was 
inconceivable until quite recently. It was only when the push for an LGBT identity 
started bearing fruit that LGBT rights became feasible. In addition, racism, especially in 
the United States, has a history of serving as the status quo in one form or another for 
centuries, whereas discrimination or prejudice based on sexuality has only become a 
salient issue within the past few decades. Finally, while the expansion of equal rights to 
housing, schools, and employment for racial minorities spurred a backlash due in part to 
the perception that Whites would be crowded out of a zero-sum marketplace, a similar  
expansion of rights for LGBT people does not lend itself to any such perception: There 
are much fewer LGBT people than there are racial minorities in the southern or urban 
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United States, and LGBT people are already afforded equal opportunity for the most part, 
though this is contingent on whether or not such people decide to stay in “the closet” in  
certain places. Aside from these differences, however, LGBT rights has overwhelmingly 
been framed by the most successful civil society actors as a civil rights or human rights 
issue, and thus there are inevitably at least some parallels that can be drawn to other civil 
rights movements.  
 The chief parallel that one can draw between civil rights movements of many 
different stripes lies in the fissure that often exists between recognition and protection 
from the state on one hand, and the attitudes held by the general public on the other. 
Whereas Brown v. Board of Education mandates a de jure desegregation of public 
schools, it took more than a decade for a de facto desegregation to occur in most 
Southern states. Trends such as these are a testament to the power of social forces 
independent of the state to reinforce status quo patterns of bias and to hinder substantive 
progress for civil rights generally.  
Legal vs. Real for LGBT People in the Developed World      
The legal-vs.-real phenomenon manifests itself in the LGBT arena in a few key 
ways. Perhaps the most intriguing manifestation of this, particularly for our purposes, is 
in the ways in which existing laws and protections often fail to protect LGBT individuals. 
For example, Jeff Gruenewald (2012) discovered that homicides committed against  
LGBT individuals are fundamentally different in nature, on average, than are those 
committed in general. Hate crimes or bias crimes of this nature often harm not only the 
immediate victim. Because the attacks tend to be reported widely as a crime specifically 
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motivated by prejudice towards the individual based on the characteristic, it reverberates 
throughout the LGBT community and leads to widespread psychological damage as well. 
In this analysis of hate crimes in the U.S., other notable differences are that perpetrators 
tend to be much whiter and younger than homicide offenders as a whole, and these 
crimes are much more likely to be committed by multiple assailants rather than an  
individual committing a shooting (Gruenewald, 2012). Furthermore, the observation 
period during which Gruenewald pulled the data showed a substantial increase in anti-
LGBT homicides, further suggesting that a backlash to increased LGBT visibility, 
increased willingness of police to report such crimes as hate crimes, or some combination 
of both are responsible. Donald Haider-Markel (2002), in focusing on the response of 
police precincts across the U.S. to hate crimes legislation, discovered that police are 
likelier to focus more resources on hate crime prevention if police staff tend to support 
the enactment of such policies, the public being served supports such policies, hate 
crimes are particularly prevalent in the jurisdiction being served, and funding and training 
aimed specifically at hate crimes. In addition, large, metropolitan cities are much likelier 
to have task forces or otherwise more generous resource allocation to combating hate 
crimes than are smaller jurisdictions – a fact that aligns at least partially with the 
populace preference, considering the relatively cosmopolitan nature of such urban 
centers. One other noteworthy finding here is that the political preferences of elites and 
elected officials within the jurisdiction do not correlate with enforcement of hate crimes 
laws as much as the attitudes of the administrative bureaucrats do (Haider-Markel, 2002). 
In essence, we see that both the public at large and administrative officials influence 
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treatment of hate crimes, and that the nature of such crimes is often fundamentally 
different from more generalized crimes. 
Sari Dworkin and Huso Yi (2003) examine the more psychological aspects of 
what drives hate crimes. Dworkin and Yi make the point that, at least as of their report, 
virtually every culture in the world subconsciously instills the notion that heterosexuality 
is the exclusive normal with respect to sexual practices and familiar structuration. This 
phenomenon is more pronounced in developing countries that lack democratic 
institutions or liberal traditions, but tends to be instilled in the younger population in 
liberal democracies as well. Dworkin and Yi conclude in part that although most hate 
crimes are effectively already prohibited both by international laws targeting abuse and 
domestic laws in a vast majority of countries, these subconscious biases tend to correlate 
to less sensitivity to the plight of LGBT-identified individuals, furthering the disparity 
between countries in protecting their LGBT populations. 
 One other concept that helps illustrate the nuances of homophobic attitudes is that 
of covering, as conceptualized by Kenji Yoshino (2006). Laying the concept out in the 
context of a three-stage progression, Yoshino outlines the cultural shift of the past few 
decades that started with demands that LGBT people convert to heterosexuality, followed 
by demands for passing, and then for demands of covering. In essence, societal demands 
of conversion lasted for virtually the entire of modern Western history and much of 
history prior, and it rested on the assumption that homosexuality is a vice that ought to be 
overcome and suppressed. Homosexuality was generally classified as a mental illness 
during this period, and forced conversion therapy on the part of the state was not unheard 
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of in much of the world. Once the idea of LGBT identity as an inherent characteristic, 
therefore qualifying as a civil rights issue in the 1960s and ‘70s, the cultural norms 
shifted away from the old assumptions based on homosexuality as a choice and instead 
placed demands on LGBT to “pass” as straight, meaning that one should make any effort 
necessary to refrain from exhibiting behavior that suggests LGBT identity, and to 
otherwise remain in “the closet” while anywhere in the public sphere. Starting in the 
1990s or so, LGBT civil rights gained more traction and more people came to know 
LGBT people personally due to more people “coming out.” Acceptance of LGBT identity 
started to solidify and it became acceptable to be “out” as an LGBT person. In spite of 
this, there are still unwritten double standards placed on LGBT people and couples, as 
demonstrated in the widespread perception that common public gestures of affection such 
as hand-holding and kissing are acts of “flaunting.” In addition, one should refrain from 
openly discussing affiliation with LGBT advocacy groups and to keep discussions of 
same-sex partners to a minimum while around heterosexual people (Yoshino, 2006).  
 In short, we should take note of the fact that (A) collective pushes for civil rights 
in general have had to overcome deeply-entrenched biases that often stubbornly remain 
even after formal, legal protections are put in place; and (B) the LGBT rights movement 
is presently in the stage of working toward ameliorating the leftover biases and prejudices 
now that basic formal protections have been put in place as per Lawrence v. Texas, the 
repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” et al. There remain disparities across the U.S. in terms 
of the extent to which rights are recognized and protected, and even the passage of laws 
are not enough to ensure that hate crimes legislation, for example, is enforced. The 
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attitudes of society at large cannot be separated from the effectiveness of legal 
protections, nor is the legal arena sufficient in fully realizing the wellbeing of stigmatized 
and historically oppressed populations. To legally protect a long-stigmatized group such 
as the LGBT community, laws combating discrimination and hate crimes are evidently 
necessary pieces of the overall puzzle.  
The Environment as it Currently Stands for LGBT People in South America 
Grupo Gay da Bahia released a report in 2010 which documented at least 3,196 
anti-LGBT murders between 1980 and 2009, suggesting what amounts to an epidemic 
(“Violence against LGBTs,” 2014). The problem has become so acute in Brazil, for 
example, that a local Workers’ Party representative in São Paulo has suggested that a 
specialized police force be created to combat anti-LGBT violence specifically, complete 
with training in counseling and human rights. The preliminary title of this unit is 
Delegacia Gay, as it would be modeled on a similar police force called Delegacia da 
Mulher (“Women’s Precinct”) (Avery, 2012; Jebsen, 2012). A number of other 
lawmakers in various levels of government have pushed for education reforms to be put 
in place so as to increase toleration. Among the most vivid and well-known recent 
examples of this phenomenon occurred in 2011, when a young man walking with a pair 
of gay friends through the heart of São Paulo’s financial district was attacked by a small 
group of assailants who crushed a fluorescent light bulb over his face (Jebsen, 2012). In 
response to this, Telma da Souza – the lawmaker who suggested that the Delegacia Gay 
be established – said in a call for a national debate on the problem, “This should not be 
occurring in the 21st century. We are not talking about gay rights here, but human rights” 
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(Souza, qtd. in Jebsen, 2012). It may be useful to note that this last plea can be easily 
placed within the context of the civil rights groups mentioned in the previous section, 
giving at least some credence to the civil rights frame. 
The arisal of the AIDS pandemic in the early 1980s demonstrates the divergence 
of social and state treatment of LGBT people. Jim Wilets (2011) notes that Brazil, like 
most of the rest of South America, saw sodomy laws repealed in the early 19th century, as 
Spanish and Portuguese penal codes were notably less harsh on the matter than was the 
British penal code, thereby setting a legal precedent that has been relatively favorable to 
LGBT interests. In light of this, coupled with the lack of an official state church to steer 
policy, Brazilian lawmakers in the 1980s found the targeting of HIV/AIDS relief to the 
LGBT community a relatively straightforward and feasible approach to attacking the 
issue. Further, this approach was cemented by the relative support offered by the 
Brazilian military – a stark contrast to the juntas ruling Argentina and Chile around that 
time – and this was due at least in part to the cycle of democratic transitions and military 
governments that pockmarked the country throughout the 20th century.  
With a strong tradition of machismo, combined with a floundering civil society 
wrecked by transient governments of radically different natures, however, murders of 
LGBT persons in the country spiked, and such has been the case more-or-less 
consistently ever since. To make matters worse, police were often party to these attacks. 
With an on-the-ground response as unfavorable as this, the LGBT movement as a whole 
had decided to take their tactics underground, thereby still lobbying legislators for 
protections and other rights, but with as little visibility as possible. What one can take 
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away from this is that the Brazilian case has by and large provided evidence that although 
open-ended institutions do not guarantee a tolerant civil society, it nevertheless shows 
that supportive institutions can sustain themselves and serve the needs of an otherwise 
widely stigmatized group.  
   The disparity in legal protections of LGBT persons throughout Latin America 
cannot be explained wholly by differences in social attitudes. But as seen in Brazil and 
Argentina, for example, the existence of exploitable political opportunities such as a 
government or other institutions committed to equal treatment as a principle, combined 
with sufficiently savvy social movement actors who are willing and able to exploit these 
loopholes, can overcome social prejudices and win some amount of legal progress and 
protection. This may only go so far when concerning the issues of rising violence 
committed toward LGBT persons, but the practice is not wholly separate from the issue, 
either.   
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CHAPTER III  
PRELIMINARY CASE STUDIES 
 
The Social Movement Process 
 When focusing on the development of LGBT rights in South America, most of the 
focus is on the period following democratization, which generally took place throughout 
the 1980s. However, some primordial LGBT-oriented groups and social movements 
formed as early as the late 1960s, so it would not be sufficient to focus solely on the post-
democratization period when tracing the development of rights. I conceptualize the 
process in three stages: (1) emergence and identity formation, (2) movement toward 
inclusion, and (3) identity synthesis.  
Emergence and Identity Formation 
 The period preceding democratization was defined in large part by systematic 
human rights violations and abuses, with practices ranging from torture, arbitrary and 
extrajudicial incarceration, forced disappearance, and exile of dissidents. Because even 
basic human rights were often disregarded, concepts of civil rights or minority protection 
were inconceivable. Nevertheless, as is often the case under such regimes, an extensive 
underground network of human rights advocates proliferated throughout this period. 
Some groups such as the OAS take a generalist approach, while others take on more 
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specialized issues, among the most notable of which would be the children’s rights 
movement in Brazil for its forthright role in exposing the abuses of the military 
government there.  
Edward Cleary (1997) lays out four overarching factors responsible for the 
“explosion” of human rights across the region. For one, a broad social breakdown 
occurred in the period immediately following democratization, complete with 
deteriorating material living standards for a majority of residents along with frustratingly 
slow progress in the encouragement by governments to participate in political matters. 
Secondly, more cosmopolitan views of human rights had taken hold, largely with the 
Catholic Church serving as a vehicle, specifically with the advent of Mother Teresa and 
liberation theology. Thirdly, relating somewhat to the first factor, frustration with the 
corruption and bureaucratic obstruction of state institutions meant that enforcement of 
new human rights norms were all too often unrealized. Finally, an infusion of influence 
from developed countries such as the U.S. and several Western European nations, 
particularly Spain, took hold (p. 64-6).  
 It stands to reason that an upwelling of civil society and particularly of human 
rights recognition would be an ideal time for the emergence of previously avant-garde 
issues such as LGBT rights. LGBT-oriented movements did indeed become more 
prominent at this time, but to understand how they arrived even at that point, it proves 
necessary to begin even earlier. Stephen Brown points out that the first explicitly LGBT-
oriented group to be founded in Latin America was the Argentinian Grupo Nuestro 
Mundo (Our World Group) in Buenos Aires in 1969. Two years later, a more radical 
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group formed by some Grupo members and a loose coalition of leftist university students 
assembled Frente de Liberación Homosexual (Homosexual Liberation Front), which 
served as a clandestine group collaborating with various women’s and workers’ rights 
groups until it was forced into dissolution in 1976 by the military junta. During this 
regime, an estimated four hundred or so gays and lesbians were murdered alongside the 
more notorious sweep of forced disappearances. Following the junta, gay and lesbian life 
“flourished,” and by the early 1990s, President Carlos Menem was pressured and shamed 
by U.S. activists during a state visit to grant legal recognition to CHA, which had been 
formed as the preeminent LGBT rights organization in Argentina following the arrest of 
over 200 gay men in a Buenos Aires bar in 1983 (Brown, 2002, p. 88).1  
Fast-forwarding quickly to the 21st century, it becomes clear that not all LGBT 
rights advocates necessarily strive toward the same goals, as the relatively recent2 
FALGBT, an umbrella organization consisting of several independent groups, has 
emphasized partner recognition while CHA has traditionally sought a broader based of 
rights, e.g. adoption, eliminating discrimination in employment, HIV/AIDS activism, et 
al (Schulenberg, 2012).   
While examining the emergence of the LGBT rights movement and discourse in 
the region, one other country warranting more extensive focus is Brazil. James Green 
(1994) illustrates that, like the advocacy groups which first emerged in Argentina, 
Brazilian advocates first organized while an undemocratic and illiberal military regime 
                                                          
1 The significance of legal recognition in this context is that it permits such actions as fundraising or taking 
official positions. What is more, prior to its recognition, the Argentinian Supreme Court defended the lack 
of legal status based on Catholic teachings (Brown, 2002, p. 90). 
2 FALGBT formed in 2006 (Schulenberg, 2012).  
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was still in place. Although gay bars and other catering venues appeared as early as the 
late 1950s when rural peasants migrated en masse to cities, the first reported LGBT-
oriented groups to organize were in 1978 and ’79 under the guise of Nucleo de Ação 
pelos Direitos dos Homossexuais (Action Nucleus for Homosexuals’ Rights). The 
primary activity of NADH consisted of publishing and distributing a tabloid entitled O 
Lampião da Esquina (Streetlight), though there were other street-based events organized 
on a regular basis. The inclusion of the term “homosexuals” in the name drew a great 
deal of controversy and ire both within the movement and among the public at large, 
primarily stemming from fears that too explicit and agenda was advertised – a potentially 
problematic transgression under a military regime. The more cautious members pushed 
for the label Somos to pay homage to the publication released by pioneering FLH in 
Argentina, but a compromise was reach in 1979 to adopt the label Somos: Grupo de 
Afirmaçao Homosexual (SGHA). The following year, an unprecedented protest took 
place in which various left-wing groups took to the streets in the country’s industrial 
center, with SGHA members chanting, “Down with repression, more love and desire!” 
(qtd. in Green, 1994, p. 71). Due to various intra-movement squabbles, combined with a 
rapidly declining sense of urgency courtesy of democratization in 1985, the movement 
became dormant and nearly dissolved completely by 1995 when the International Gay 
and Lesbian Association (ILGA) hosted their international conference in Rio de Janeiro, 
having been summoned by an invitation by what had become the preeminent LGBT 
rights group in Brazil, Grupo Gay da Bahia. 
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Although the proverbial seeds of LGBT rights activism were largely planted in 
Argentina and Brazil, other countries in the region have shown signs of emergence. In 
Chile, for example, a series of HIV/AIDS-combating groups formed in the late 1980s, 
while Movimiento de Integración y Liberación Homosexual (Movilh) formed separately 
in 1991 post-Pinochet to promote gay empowerment. Because of this fragmentation and 
structural weakness, Tim Frasca hypothesizes that legal progress has been blunted 
relative to that seen in other countries such as Argentina and Uruguay (2005). A largely 
disparate network of activists nearly succeeded in including an anti-discrimination clause 
in the Venezuelan constitution of 1999, but it was struck down at the last minute by local 
Catholic authorities (Merentes, 2000). Broadly speaking, there have been at least some 
efforts and at least some level of organization in virtually every country in the region, but 
strategies, tactics, and priorities can and often do differ. 
Factionalization 
 Upon maturing in the 1980s into the mid-1990s, a number of rifts and 
disagreements tended to form within and between LGBT groups. Stephen Brown (2002) 
points to three categories into which advocates tend to fall: assimilationist, civil rights-
based, and radical. Assimilationist organizations emphasize the status of LGBT persons 
as citizens and as equals who are entitled to the same rights as everyone else, thereby  
justifying the expansion of partnership recognition or marriage on the grounds that it is  
necessary for the fulfillment of rights that have already been guaranteed by the state 
and/or society.3 Tactically, assimilationists are the most likely to emphasize the use of 
court cases as a stair-stepping process toward equality. Civil rights-based groups, like 
                                                          
3 For more in-depth reading on this matter, see Sullivan, 1995.  
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assimilationists, tend to normalize homosexuality in the public consciousness, but unlike 
them advocate in favor of a “different-but-equal” framing (Brown, 2002, p. 93-4). Civil 
rights framers will acknowledge that fundamental differences do exist which require 
some form of special accommodation, e.g. focus with respect to HIV/AIDS treatment or 
hate crimes laws to protect from social violence. Finally, radical framers claim that the 
currently existing models for sexuality as black-and-white traits that are unmalleable is 
too simplistic and restrictive. These avant-garde activists assume that sexuality is more 
fluid and complicated than its mainstream presentation suggests, claiming that openly 
LGBT people have instead embraced a potential that exists within everyone to some 
degree.4 Examples of each type along with their tactics have appeared in Latin American 
LGBT social movements. 
 Among the most prominent assimilationist organizations promoting LGBT rights 
in Latin America, CHA and Sociedad de Integración Gay-Lésbica Argentina (SIGLA) 
and ABLGBTT in Brazil are perhaps most illustrative. For instance, CHA has long been 
at the forefront of the broader push for incremental changes in that country, primarily 
through the courts. Likewise, ABLGBTT is the umbrella organization in Brazil that 
pushed for the long series of judicial battles beginning with claims to material benefits for 
partners and culminating in same-sex marriage (see Moreira, 2012)). More generally, as 
Brown states, assimilationist groups are the most inclined to interact with the state and 
with larger human rights organizations, and conversely less inclined to interact with other 
activists and organizations (2002, p. 93). These groups tend to be the most pragmatic and 
                                                          
4 For more in-depth reading on this matter, see Warner, 1999.  
 
  
27 
 
results-oriented, there leading to potential conflicts with groups placing more emphasis 
on maintaining the identity or message behind the push to begin with.  
 Civil rights-based groups are exemplified in part by FALGBT – the other major 
player in in Argentina besides CHA – as well as Gays DC, the latter of which focuses as 
well on HIV/AIDS issues in Buenos Aires. FALGBT is an umbrella organization which 
is comprised of several preexisting organizations, many of which had somewhat differing 
priorities, but one of the most common themes among them is a skepticism and even 
aversion to the state, given its historically oppressive capacity to imprison and brutalize 
(Brown, 2002, 94). FALGBT is adamant in its insistence on realizing the passage of anti-
discrimination protections specifically for LGBT people, whereas Gays DC likewise 
pushed for state-appointed legal aid for HIV-positive individuals who have suffered 
concrete discrimination. In each of these cases, it follows that the state must recognize a 
fundamental distinction that exists between the LGBT populace and everyone else, since 
the discrimination in question is claimed to be unique to that population. Nevertheless, 
FALGBT is also the organization which pushed for same-sex marriage in the Argentinian 
Congress (see Schulenberg, 2012, forthcoming). In this sense, the assimilationist and 
civil rights-based activists are not mutually exclusive, as both tend to favor some form of 
state recognition and equality of legal protection. The key difference lies in which 
approach is presumed best to accomplish this.  
 Radical LGBT activists, in sharp contrast to the other two categories, reject such 
labels as “homosexual” or “lesbian” as character descriptions, instead basing all strategies 
and goals on the assumption that oppression of LGBT rights comes in the form of 
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socially-enforced suppression of the homosexuality that exists within everyone. Further, 
this type of oppression is intricately linked, radical activists assert, to all other forms of 
oppression that exist as an inevitable consequence of a capitalistic social order. As a 
result, radicals often find themselves profoundly at odds with civil rights advocates and 
especially with assimilationists, with the latter sometimes being viewed as even worse 
than the police, state, and other oppressive agents, given their role as insiders. Among the 
most active such groups is the FLH, who notably claimed that existing rights discourse 
affords nothing of value to difference, given its assumptions of universality, and have 
consistently criticized CHA for ceding short-term tolerance for long-term identity 
maintenance, and have consistently criticized CHA for conceding long-term social 
recalibration in favor of short-term tolerance (Brown, 2002, p. 95). By and large, at least 
as far as policies achievements are concerned, radical groups are now largely absent as 
cohesive LGBT rights advocates. This is likely due on the one hand to the inherent 
difficulty of maintaining a distinctive identity while denouncing the very existence of 
such a fixed identity in the first place, and on the other hand to the concrete policy 
victories seen by such groups as ABLGBTT and FALGBT.   
 The movement in Brazil during the factionalization stage was marked by a dearth 
of activism in general due to the onset of democracy and the widespread presumption of 
liberalization and an auto-piloted restoration of civil liberties. This was also, as seen in 
Argentina, a period of lacking cohesion among activists and of infighting within groups. 
Indeed, given the sheer size along with the political structure of the country, it might only 
stand to reason that fragmentation of some form is inevitable. Despite all of this, Grupo 
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Gay da Bahia spearheaded a successful national campaign to gain legal recognition from 
the federal government in 1988, which spurred a renewal in the movement as a whole 
(Green, 1994). At around the same time, the AIDS crisis had peaked, thereby providing 
additional fuel to encourage renewed vigor for LGBT rights activism. One other factor 
that effectively forced the dormant movement out of its lull was an alarming and 
unexpected rise in violence committed against visibly LGBT persons, particularly gay 
and effeminate men. While this did not necessarily lead to a coalescence of advocacy 
groups within the country, it did at the very least demonstrate a need for and benefits of 
taking a more positive role expand and solidify rights. 
Identity Synthesis 
 Although a specific time frame is difficult to pin down, the recent policy 
successes in at least some countries within the region are attributable in large part to 
developments that occurred in the mid-to-late 1990s. It was at this time when LGBT 
rights groups in the region had begun to connect in a substantial way to the global 
community, which in turn provided activists with resources, both material and strategic,  
that had never even been conceived before. In 1995 when ILGA decided to host their 
annual conference on global LGBT rights in Rio de Janeiro. The significance of this, in a 
nutshell, is that it represents a break point at which the boundaries of nation-state and 
norms of the region were being transcended, leading to a reinvigorated movement first in 
Brazil, then in Argentina, then followed by the rest of the region, however unevenly.   
 The upcoming case studies will cover the contemporary affairs of the South 
American LGBT rights movements in much greater detail, but prior to that, it is helpful 
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to keep the following in developments in mind as they have unfolded during this stage: 
First, there has been a general movement in the direction of greater cohesion, perhaps 
most visible in the formation of ABLGBTT in Brazil and FALGBT in Argentina.  
Secondly, the framing of the issues have likewise coalesced, moving from the tripartite 
fragmentation found during the factionalization period immediately preceding and 
immediately following democratization. The radical factions have largely dissolved or 
collapsed into the new umbrella organizations, presumably due to pressure from the 
infusion of liberal norms from the international realm, and perhaps related to the parallel 
developments seen in left-wing political parties throughout the region excepting 
Venezuela and Bolivia. Finally, it is not until the synthesis period that we have seen 
concrete policy objectives being realized in the form of partnership recognition and anti-
discrimination legislation. This does not necessarily imply that similar progress in the 
realm of civil society and the attitudes of the public, as the continuing scourge of anti-
LGBT violence in Brazil starkly shows. Nevertheless, the recent period of activism has 
shown a definitive acceleration of concessions on the part of the state in those countries 
that have been most receptive to civil society and to emerging global norms. 
 In countries that have seen at least a handful of social movements pushing 
specifically for LGBT rights since prior to democratization, there is a greater likelihood 
that such countries will have larger and more cohesive umbrella organizations that direct 
LGBT interests to a common goal. Because of this common goal and funneling of 
available resources to that goal or set of goals, it stands to reason that countries with 
consolidated interest groups will see much greater likelihood of policy passage and/or 
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positive court rulings. The international norm diffusion literature (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; 
Risse & Sikkink, 1999; Lutz & Sikkink, 2002; Murdie & Davis, 2012; Holzhacker, 2013) 
strongly suggests that human rights norms tend to be introduced to developing countries 
via effects such as the boomerang and spiral models. These are in turn carried out by 
domestic actors whose success is contingent on their size, wealth, and cohesiveness. 
 
Argentina and the Spanish Precedent 
Examining the case of Argentina more closely, Shawn Schulenberg (2012) laid 
out comprehensive description of the events and actors which took place leading up to the 
enactment of same-sex marriage in 2010. First, one should be careful to distinguish 
between constitutional and civil law in this context, as the former is ambiguous, stating 
that “The private actions of men which in no way offend public order or morality, nor 
injure a third party, only reserved to God and are exempted from the authority of judges” 
(Constitución de la Nación Argentina, 1994). Civil law is much more straightforward in 
regulating marriage as between a man and a woman only, as per Article 172 of the 
Argentine Civil Code (Código Civil de Argentina). The judiciary in general and the 
Supreme Court in particular are very reluctant to rule in a manner that might be perceived 
as either nullifying existing law or violating the wishes of the president who enacted 
them. Because of this, a series of unsuccessful court cases throughout most of the first 
decade of the new millennium gave way in 2009 to a ruling by an administrative judge in 
Buenos Aires which granted full marriage rights to same-sex couples. The administrative 
judge in the Buenos Aires ruling reasoned that because the constitution for the 
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independent city of Buenos Aires explicitly prohibits any discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, any provisions on the federal level which dictated otherwise proves 
unconstitutional as far as the city was concerned. What is more, the generally 
conservative mayor at the time expressly stated that he would not appeal the ruling 
(Schulenburg, 2012, p. 114-5). This was a truly groundbreaking decision, as it clearly led 
to a cascade of much further-reaching demands. 
This evidently led to a flood of judges willing to publicly step up and speak in 
favor of such unions, as four other cases were ruled affirmatively within the next year 
(Schulenburg, 2012, p. 115-6). The executive branch, namely President Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner, began to speak passionately in favor of same-sex marriage that 
year as well, presumably because of the pressure that built from the recent cascade of 
positive rulings in courts throughout the country combined with additional pressure from 
one particular arm of the executive branch – the National Institute Against 
Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Racism (INADI) (p. 117-8).  
Finally, in the legislative branch, thanks in no small part to the vocal support of 
the President, a law recognizing same-sex marriage nationwide successfully passed. This 
happened in light of the fact that the Justicialist Party – the party to which Fernandez de 
Kirchner belongs – held a majority in the legislature that year as well. Further, because 
political parties in Argentina tend to be very deferential to their leaders, it stood to reason 
that Justicialist legislators would quickly fall in line, and with additional lobbying by 
activist groups, they did precisely that (p. 119-22). These are, in essence, the institutional 
factors at play. Cruz reasons that activists pursued change through the legislature in 
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Argentina due to the Argentine judiciary’s history of utilizing “Catholic ethics,” in 
addition to the evidently lopsided nature of the way in which standing is granted to 
different parties: In order to challenge a same-sex union in court, one need simply be a 
“concerned citizen,” whereas one must rigorously prove that they are in a relationship 
whose stature vis-à-vis the state leads to sufficient hardship (p. 334-5, 351). With these 
factors taken into account, we can undoubtedly say that LGBT rights advocates would do 
well to pursue their interests through the legislature and to gain support from the 
President in order to succeed.  
Aside from institutional factors, influence came from elsewhere. The literature 
strongly suggests that influence from outside the country’s borders played a substantial 
role as well (Brown, 2002; Piatti-Crocker, 2010; Friedman, 2012; Bonomo, 2013). Brown 
(2002), for example, notes that a combination of factors including the return to 
democratic rule, the rapid dissemination of a human rights-centric discourse, and a 
measure of international support all coalesced in Argentina as early as the 1980s so as to 
create a foundation favorable to the successes seen decades later. This conclusion can be 
reached, Brown argues, by viewing LGBT activism in Argentina through the political-
opportunity-structures lens. Breaking LGBT rights movements down into three broadly-
defined groups – identity-based, civil rights-based, and radical – Brown notes that up to 
that point, those framing the issue in a civil rights fashion proved most successful as far 
as policy concessions are concerned, at least in Buenos Aires. Meanwhile, the identity-
framing groups often clashed with the radicals as the former wished to achieve equality 
by means of eliminating any gendered language from marriage laws and generally 
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eliminating the role of the state in regulating domestic affairs at all, whereas the former 
premised their grievances on their LGBT identities to being with. As such, the civil rights 
framers were able to take advantage of the aforementioned conditions in place and 
achieve concrete concessions from the state.     
Citing the precedent of a system to establish quotas for women in the legislature 
in the 1990s, Piatti-Crocker (2010) contrasts the Argentine LGBT movement of the 
following decade from the quota movement by noting that it is and always has been 
relatively fragmented. In addition, mobilization occurred through a pattern of upward 
diffusion, beginning in the independent city of Buenos Aires along with a handful of 
other municipalities across the nation. This upward diffusion proved very slow and 
increasingly frustrating, so more aggressive pursuit of same-sex marriage legislation on 
the federal level had been adopted (FALGBT), which served as something of an umbrella 
group for a previously disparate network of activists (Piatti-Crocker, 2010, p. 52). 
Although the group which until then was most active – CHA – had been more cautious 
and pushed for civil unions, FALGBT along with the aid of INADI took cues from 
legislation in Spain and elsewhere in Europe to draft the marriage legislation that 
eventually became law (p. 53-4). The thesis here largely parallels that of Brown, with the 
added emphasis of being able to overcome opponents, namely the Catholic Church. 
Friedman (2012) expands upon the international diffusion thesis by revealing that 
the Spanish government, in the wake of legalizing same-sex marriage there in 2005, 
financially backed activists groups across Latin America and particularly Argentina. This 
practice came with a great deal of precedent in that Spain has remained involved in the 
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region in a number of ways, be it economic, political, or cultural, including in 
transitioning to democracy during the decade or so between the fall of Franco and the 
third wave of democratization. The Triangle Foundation, which emerged from the Franco 
dictatorship as a key LGBT rights promoter in Spain, was particularly well-connected to 
civil society groups in Argentina, effectively underwriting the efforts of CHA and later 
FALGBT with both financial support and legislative blueprints (Friedman, 2012). We 
may draw from this that the influence from abroad and particularly from Spanish 
government and civil society may actually have proven a necessary condition for the 
successful implementation of nationwide LGBT rights policies, as the finances and 
legislative precedent at the time was not self-evidently conducive to the successful 
enactment of such.  
Bonomo notes that Argentina has historically been more broadly receptive to 
international developments, including those within the sociocultural realm. Examples 
aside from interaction with Spanish organizations include the successful lobbying by 
CHA of the Norwegian and American Red Cross organizations to provide substantial 
funding to AIDS research in Argentina (Bonomo, 2013). What is more, international 
human rights norms in addition to material resource diffusion has clearly made its way 
into Argentine civil society in all three branches of government along with its non-
government organizations, ranging from a developing current of strict scrutiny in the 
federal judiciary to influencing civil society organizations to reframe their struggles in 
terms of human rights rather than on strictly identity-based claims or trying to radically 
alter the priorities of the state: The judiciary has reformed itself to treat LGBT rights 
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more as a human rights issue in general, thereby creating a trajectory based on favorable 
rulings for survival benefits toward greater interpretation of LGBT rights as human rights 
(Saldivia, 2010). The influence on civil society groups such as CHA and FALGBT 
largely corroborates Brown’s (2002) thesis. No doubt, Argentina has on the whole proven 
very receptive to international influence, particularly since democratization in the 1980s.  
 
Judicial Innovation in Brazil 
With respect to Brazil, gaining progress through Congress is exceedingly difficult 
in light of its historical inability to pass anything unless there is a broad, nationwide 
consensus is shared. On top of this, as de la Cruz points out, there is little pooling of 
resources or engagement between the hundreds of LGBT activist groups throughout the 
country. A handful of disparate groups with comparatively more resources must 
effectively go it alone. Confronting these two obstacles, a handful of relatively influential  
activist groups developed a campaign of litigation on behalf of aggrieved same-
sex couples (de la Cruz, 2013). Thanks to the presence of unusually receptive Supreme 
Federal Court justices, the Court ruled in 2011 that civil unions must be recognized on 
the basis of constitutional rights for families, and this was expanded through the same 
avenue to full marriage two years later.  
The Brazilian constitution is noted particularly for its heavy emphasis no only on 
individual but also on collective rights, as well as for its assignment of the Office of 
Public Prosecutor who wields unprecedented authority over the enforcement of 
constitutional duties and Brazilian public administration more generally. Another key 
  
37 
 
aspect of the Brazilian constitution that proves uniquely influential in court rulings 
favoring same-sex couples ruling by the Supreme Federal Court that such couples fall 
under the guise of family units. This stems from a broader trend within Brazilian law in 
which unmarried couples, largely on the basis of the family-oriented rationale reached by 
the Supreme Federal Court, are granted de facto marriage rights regardless (Moreira, 
2012). This suggests that Brazilian LGBT rights activists were not content merely with 
material guarantees – they instead continued pushing for identity-based rights, using the 
substantive guarantees granted them as a base on which to build a conceptual pyramid. 
This phenomenon may in fact shed light on why there has been less of a push for full 
marriage rights as we have seen in developed countries as well as in Argentina – as long 
as the same effective rights have already been granted, then why expend the resources on 
pushing for full de jure or full formal marriage rights? Moreira outlines a five-stage 
litigation process with respect to same-sex unions that has been largely unique to Brazil: 
(1) a demand for equal property and inheritance rights; (2) reacting to the struggles of 
entering the institutions which regulate domestic cohabitation; (3) a wave of lawsuits 
aimed at sanctioning gay rights as diffuse rights; (4) litigation up to the level of the 
Supreme Federal Court for the recognition of same-sex unions as stable unions; and (5) 
further litigation for converting said unions into full marriages (Moreira, 2012). This 
process will be further fleshed out in turn. 
An increase in demands among same-sex couples for equal treatment with respect 
to property and inheritance served as the gateway through which future lawsuits 
revolving around same-sex marriage would follow. Particularly with respect to social 
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security benefits, a series of lower-court rulings provided mixed decisions throughout the 
country in the early 2000s, culminating in a 2007 ruling by the Supreme Federal Court 
that the Brazilian constitution mandates equal protection of same-sex couples on these 
grounds (Moreira, 2012, p. 1021-4). Notably, given the unique emphasis on family rights, 
the constitution regulates cohabitation in a particularly rigorous fashion. Defining “stable 
unions” in an a priori fashion as heterosexual ones at first, the litigation wave of the early 
2000s sought to roll same-sex unions into this definition. Prior to the aforementioned 
ruling, judges were effectively prohibited from analogizing same-sex and married 
couples, for the definition of “stable union” could now much more plausibly be extended 
to same-sex couples. This was expanded in light of a state court ruling in the Rio Grande 
do Sul which opened civil unions (and two years later, marriage) to same-sex couples 
there (p. 1025-8).  
The concept of collective rights has been uniquely enshrined in the Brazilian 
constitution and has, in light of a lawsuit wave not unlike that engineered by FALGBT in 
Argentina, helped speed the process of folding individual same-sex rights into this 
process (p. 1030-5). Following these lawsuits, two offices – the Rio de Janeiro Solicitor 
and the Office of the Solicitor General – had been brought to court for illicitly 
recognizing same-sex unions as per federal law as it stood at the time. The Supreme 
Federal Court ruled in favor of the offices, disregarding precedent and instead expanding 
the 2004 Rio Grande do Sul ruling to the entire country in 2011 (p. 1036-7). Through the 
two years that followed, another series of mixed lower-court rulings ended up at the 
Supreme Federal Court, with full marriage rights being granted to same-sex couples in 
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May 2013. It was ultimately decided that a distinction must be made between civil and 
religious marriages, since it was no longer the case that the Catholic Church was the sole 
arbiter of the institution as it had been in earlier years of the republic’s existence (p. 
1040-2). In sum, it is readily apparent that a sustained effort on the part of a loose, 
nationwide coalition of plaintiffs backed by key institutions such as the Office of the 
Solicitor General proved instrumental in facilitating a gradual progression toward full 
marriage rights afforded to same-sex couples on a national basis. 
Why has progress with respect to LGBT rights been so heavily skewed toward the 
judiciary in Brazil? Political parties are not particularly well disciplined, nor are they as 
deferential to their leaders. As a result of this, it can be much more difficult to form 
enduring coalitions to push bills through the legislature. Furthermore, unlike in the case 
of Argentina and the nation’s civil code does not neatly or definitively outline marriage 
as between a man and a woman, as established in Article 1,723: “The marriage takes 
place when a man and a woman express before a judge their willingness to establish 
conjugal ties, and a judge declares them married” (Código Civil de Brasil, translated by 
Schulenburg, 2010). In addition to this relatively weak phrasing, the Constitution 
explicitly states that the duties of a republic are to “promote the well-being of all, without 
prejudice as to origin, race, sex, age, and any other forms of discrimination” 
(Constitución da República Federativa do Brasil, tranlated by Schulenburg, 2010). 
Finally, it should be noted that President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was perhaps the most 
vocal advocate of same-sex marriage of any Latin American executive to date 
(Schulenburg, 2010). It rapidly becomes intuitive as to why the Supreme Federal Court 
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reached the verdict that it did when considering the fact that Lula appointed nine of the 
eleven justices serving since 2010 (Jardim de Santa Cruz & Garoupa, 2011). Given the 
events seen thus far, it would appear that the sluggishness of the Brazilian legislature has 
not stood in the way of LGBT rights activists.  
The process in Brazil differed mainly in that it bypassed the legislative branch due 
in no small part to long-observed difficulties on the part of the Brazilian Congress to pass 
even laws which may have had wide coalitions of support, never minding relatively novel 
and niche interests such as same-sex union recognition. A number of movements, perhaps 
most notable among them being ABLGBTT and Grupo Gay da Bahía developed in the 
1980s and ’90s, not coincidently arising shortly after the rise of democracy. These 
movements have shown a very dynamic two-way relationship with international human 
rights norms when it comes to LGBT rights. As Christine Bonomo (2013) notes, Brazil 
has not only shown influence from, but it has in turn lent influence to, international legal 
norms with respect to LGBT rights.  
This phenomenon can be traced back as far as 1995 when ILGA (International 
Lesbian and Gay Association) hosted its annual global conference in Rio de Janeiro. At 
that conference, a number of activists from developed countries in Western Europe along 
with the U.S. met with fledgling NGOs coordinators in Brazil and encouraged them to 
travel to their countries so as to see how organization and lobbying efforts are done there 
(Bonomo, 2013). After gaining resources, information, and general know-how from 
varied organizations applying different tactics, activists brought the tactics home and 
began to aggressively apply them there. On the state level, progress appeared in Rio 
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Grande do Sul when a 2004 court ruling mandated that civil unions be recognized there, 
followed by a 2006 ruling in the same state mandating legal adoption for same-sex 
couples (Notary RS accept gay marriage registration, 2006). There are factors beyond the 
domestic realm which must be addressed as well, however.  
In 2003, Brazil introduced the Resolution on Human Rights and Sexual 
Orientation to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the signatories of which consisted 
entirely of European and Commonwealth Realm countries in addition to the U.S.5 Among 
the most noteworthy aspects of this resolution are its second and third bullet items stating 
that the enjoyment of human rights “... should not be hindered in any way on the grounds 
of sexual orientation,” and calling upon states to promote and protect the human rights of 
all persons regardless of their sexual orientation (Brazilian Resolution, 2003). Four years 
later, showing a commitment to this cause, the Brazilian delegation to the U.N. sponsored 
the Yogyakarta Principles. In essence, this doctrine seeks to extend preexisting human 
rights norms to the area of sexual orientation and gender identity, developed through a 
seminar in Yogyakarta, Indonesia by an international panel of human rights scholars and 
experts. The following year, yet another significant breakthrough had occurred in which 
Grupo Gay da Bahía successfully persuaded the federal government to hold a national 
LGBT rights conference in which policy ideas and concerns over the trend of rising anti-
LGBT violence throughout the country were addressed (Bonomo, 2013). Of course, 
                                                          
5 Likely resulting in part from the aforementioned developments in addition to the widespread 
dissemination of predominately U.S. media covering the tail-end of the AIDS crisis, the debates leading up 
to the drafting and implementation of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the Defense of Marriage Act, and the 
controversy surrounding the murder of openly gay Wyoming college student Matthew Shepard (Bonomo, 
2013). 
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statements and proposals at the U.N. and other international level do not by any means 
translate directly into domestic policy absent additional key players, hence the role of 
domestic civil society actors. 
One area in the realm of LGBT rights that has met relatively limited success can 
be seen in the alarming headlines that have appeared as of late regarding an apparent 
spike in violence directed toward LGBT people. Although it is as yet impossible to say 
definitively, this does appear to be some form of backlash against the rapidly increasing 
visibility of the LGBT community stemming from the policy successes that they have 
won. There have already been attempts by Congress to stem the bloodshed, but it has 
been blocked by the country’s powerful legislative block of evangelical Christian 
conservatives. Perhaps the most notable of these was proposed by senator and former 
mayor of São Paulo Marta Suplicy simply dubbed the Anti-Homophobia Law, and it 
would have effectively criminalized any public utterances against homosexuality. In light 
of growing frustration with continued failures in the Brazilian Congress, some notable 
initiatives have taken place on the local level, particularly in São Paulo where a 
specialized police force that would be named Delegacia Gay would be trained 
specifically to counteract anti-LGBT violence in the city (Avery, 2012; Jebsen, 2012). 
The broader lesson to taken from these developments is that mere legal recognition on the 
part of the state is not necessarily enough to protect from non-state aggressors. The quest 
for LGBT rights lies beyond the fight for same-sex marriage.   
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Developments for LGBT Rights in Other South American Countries 
While Argentina and Brazil have been by far the most thoroughly studied 
countries to date with respect to the development of LGBT rights, it is abundantly clear 
that this is a broader, regional phenomenon in many respects. It stands to reason that 
some level of diffusion would happen throughout the region as a whole, given the relative 
constancy of religion, socioeconomic indicators, political culture, and institutional 
structures which exist there.  Although it does not yet garner as much focus as the pair of 
countries examined thus far, we will briefly account for some of them in turn. 
Aside from Argentina and Brazil, there is one other federal republic on the continent – 
Venezuela. This is worth pointing out because there appears to be some advantage in the 
ability of subnational entities to experiment with policies so that they might diffuse 
upward. As things presently stand, one Venezuelan state – Mérida – recognizes same-sex  
civil unions as of 2005. As per the upward diffusion hypothesis, one would expect for 
Venezuela to have seen more progress by now, but Mérida remains the only jurisdiction 
with any kind of recognition of LGBT rights. The blockage of anti-discrimination 
provisions in the 1999 constitution which coincided with the assumption of power by 
Hugo Chávez may provide some insight into this matter, though – although the 
Constitutional Commission was on the verge of including a clause to expressly forbid 
discrimination by public or private organizations nationwide, the Opus Dei branch of the 
powerful Catholic presence in the country convinced the head of the Commission, 
himself and Opus Dei member, to drop the provision (Merentes, 2010). In addition to the 
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strength of the Catholic Church, it is also possible that the priorities of the government 
under Chávez have simply not prioritized action on this front. 
In something of a contrast to Venezuela, the 2008 constitution of Ecuador 
includes a clause that mandates state recognition of same-sex civil unions, though it along 
with President Rafael Correas emphatically stopped short of endorsing full marriage 
equality. Before addressing this, it might be worth noting that the previous constitution, 
drafted in 1998, expressly prohibited discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. 
This was expanded and included civil union recognition in the most recent constitution, 
but a number of LGBT rights activists in the country have lamented that the explicit line 
drawn for marriage suggests a compromise made with its more conservative drafters, as 
well as with the Catholic and evangelical elements within the country. In particular, the 
governing party, Alianza PAIS, was split roughly in half with respect to LGBT rights, 
thereby suggesting that a compromise of sorts may be necessary in order to achieve any 
advancement at all, as well as to avoid and anti-LGBT backlash (Corrales, 2010). This 
reflects the leverage enjoyed by both sides of the split in question, and it dictated that 
more conservative voices on the drafting committee had just enough of it to ratchet down 
the final product. 
In Chile, some interesting developments have taken place. First, it might be worth 
mentioning that the Chilean Senate is unique among legislative chambers both within and 
outside Latin America in that there is a panel of seats reserved for appointed legislators 
who were appointed by the outgoing Pinochet regime in the early 1990s (Frasca, 2005). 
There is debatably a very loose pair of coalitions which forms a de facto two-party 
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system, but if there is, “party” discipline is very limited – more akin to that seen in Brazil 
rather than in Argentina. Given these developments, it is difficult to say why the status of 
LGBT rights legislation is where it is (very limited to nonexistent), but we might 
preliminarily hypothesize that similar problems persist as those in the Brazilian 
legislature. The formation of alliances is evidently very crucial in Chilean politics, as the 
party system is so transient. This likely explains why there have been no success to date 
in legislating same-sex union recognition, for instance, despite the fact that that there 
have been no fewer than four attempts within the past decade (Núñez González, 2010). 
Niche issues such as LGBT rights would have a difficult time passing through such a 
system, and the fact that the democratic transition took place later on in Chile may also 
serve as a hindrance.   
   Jordi Díez offers brief insight on the cases of Colombia and Peru. The judicial 
avenue has the avenue of choice there, and with some success if not as much as has been 
seen in Brazil. With a more restrictive constitution defining marriage explicitly as 
between a man and a woman as outlined in Article 42 of the constitution (Constitución 
Política de Colombia), combined with a perennially resistant legislature, the 
Constitutional Court has de facto ruled that same-sex civil unions must be recognized 
through a trio of rulings on pensions and social security inheritance rights in 2007, 2008, 
and 2011. In Peru, on the other hand, activist groups pursued the legislative route in light 
of the presence of an atrophied and deeply conservative court of last resort, but to no 
avail. This is almost certainly due at least in part to consistently low public approval of 
homosexuality in general (Díez, 2013). This helps to demonstrate the lack of uniformity 
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across the continent despite the apparent presence of at least some impetus for LGBT 
rights in the region as a whole. 
 
Preliminary Conclusions 
 From the work done thus far on the politics of LGBT rights in South America, we 
can note that one of the most important factors predicting the likelihood of progress on 
the LGBT rights front is how tightly or broadly a given country’s constitution defines 
such concepts as marriage and individual rights. We have seen that in Brazil, for instance, 
litigators on behalf of aggrieved same-sex couples wielded the constitutional language 
establishing such substantive guarantees as Social Security and pension benefits to  
spouses to extend it to the partners of same-sex couples, which judges ruled was only 
necessary given the looseness of the language with respect to gender.  This was 
subsequently seized upon to push for greater recognition of same-sex couples to the point 
of nationwide recognition of full same-sex marriage. Likewise in Colombia, aggrieved 
couples and their counsel were able to take advantage of the substantive guarantees 
provided for by the constitution to ensure that same-sex couples must have rights similar 
to married opposite-sex couples, if not officially recognized as such in the end.  
 Another predictive factor is the institutional framework with which advocates 
must cope, specifically the structure and discipline of the political parties, as well as those 
parties’ relationship with the president. We saw in Argentina, for instance, that the ideal 
combination of party discipline and presidential support allowed for the same-sex  
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marriage bill there to pass both chambers of Congress and proceed to be signed into law 
by the president. Brazil, in contrast, has yet to see any LGBT rights-oriented legislation 
pass its Congressional chambers despite the presence of a highly and outspokenly 
supportive president, and this undoubtedly stems from the lack of discipline seen within 
its party structure, as this has historically proven detrimental to the speed of and ability to 
pass laws focused on relatively niche interests. Tangentially related is the disposition of 
the judiciary in a given country. We have seen in Argentina, for example, that it is by and 
large much easier to challenge same-sex unions than it is to argue in favor of their 
recognition due both to structural factors as well as the use of Roman Catholic doctrine in 
court rulings. Those countries in which church and state are more decisively separated 
such as Brazil, Colombia, or Ecuador, the rationale for ruling against the recognition of 
same-sex couples or individuals is made seriously limited. 
 Third, the structure and prevalence of social movements evidently proves crucial 
to the success of LGBT rights policies in a given country. We have seen in Argentina for 
instance that a well-organized and cohesive umbrella front – FALGBT – had pursued an 
ambitious push for legislating full same-sex marriage on a nationwide basis, and such 
would not have been accomplished had it not been for the initial push by this or some 
other social movement force. The literature has suggested that more monolithic, 
centralized, and resource-equipped social movements will tend to focus more on agreed-
upon, consensus-framed issues rather than attempting to pursue a disparate set of  
different if not unrelated policy goals, as is evidently the case in Brazil (and the United 
States, for that matter). In addition to these domestic factors is the influence of 
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international organizations and norms. Much of the impetus for the push for LGBT rights 
in Brazil stemmed from the coalescence of its primordial and fragmented activist groups 
at the 1995 of ILGA at Rio de Janeiro, whereupon organization leaders were invited to 
Spain and other European countries which had shown more progress on the LGBT rights 
policy front. Taking cues from them in areas ranging from organizational structure to 
policy templates. Additionally, it has been well-documented that the marriage legislation 
passed by the Argentine Congress drew generously from the legislation passed in Spain 
five years prior.  
 Finally, it is not possible to assess the feasibility of LGBT rights progression 
without accounting for the broader cultural context within which it takes place. 
Undoubtedly the most visible impediment to many goals set forth by LGBT rights 
advocates is the Catholic Church, and perhaps more generally, the cultural influence and 
sentiments generated by it. We have seen that the anti-discrimination provisions initially 
provided for in the 1999 Venezuelan constitution were ultimately struck down by 
Catholic opposition. Likewise in Argentina, Cardinal Jorge Bergoglio (now Pope Francis) 
led the opposition to the same-sex marriage bill that was in progress there, even though it 
ultimately passed despite this. Catholic opposition to explicitly including same-sex 
marriage in the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution dictated that they would have to settle for 
lesser civil unions instead. More broadly, public opinion data shows that there is a wide 
disparity between countries within the region with respect to favoring same-sex unions.  
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CHAPTER IV  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Constitutional Language 
H1: The presence of a constitutional provision for unions or families will substantially 
facilitate pro-LGBT policies if worded in a gender-neutral fashion, but hinder it if 
gendered. 
 The language of a given country’s constitution will help determine the feasibility 
of such policies as same-sex marriage and civil unions. On the one hand, if there is a 
provision that establishes a right to form and maintain a family, but without any mention 
to gender, it will be more difficult to deny equal access to such entitlements as social 
security benefits or pensions from same-sex partners than if no such language existed at 
all. On the other hand, it will be much more difficult to determine this to be the case if the 
constitution outlines such a right while also interjecting gendered language. This should 
be the case especially when dealing with judicial rulings one the matter, though to a 
lesser extent it should also be expected that legislation would be impacted by 
constitutions as well. Literature on the matter (Moreira, 2012; de la Cruz, 2013) has  
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already hinted at this as a substantial factor, so it is appropriate to account for it in a  
systematic study of the phenomenon as well.     
 
Federalism 
H2: LGBT rights policy is more likely to reach the federal level if state- or local-level 
experimentation has taken place.  
With respect to policies stemming from relatively niche interests such as LGBT 
rights, abortion rights, drug legalization, lottery implementation, et al., the best way to 
gain traction tends to be by way of upward diffusion (Berry, 1994; Makse & Volden, 
2011; Riverstone-Newell, 2012; Shipan & Volden, 2012). In essence, when precedent 
can be set at some level within a country or a state, the policy in question moves beyond 
a mere abstraction and can be judged based on its outcomes rather than on speculation, 
which is typically anchored in ideology and biases. Once the policy can be judged on a 
more concrete level, and assuming none of the perceived negative consequences come to 
pass, activist groups can make a more concerted push to expand the policy to the next 
federal level, or to the state level in the context of local policies, without nearly as much 
concern for ideologically-driven pushback.  
 
Social Movements 
H3: LGBT movements will prove more effective with greater overall cohesiveness along 
with linkages to international and Western organizations. 
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 Among the most important takeaways from the literature on social movements for 
LGBT rights in South America thus far is that the maturity and professionalization of a 
the organizational infrastructure within a given country matters a great deal as far as 
success in pressing for policy outcomes is concerned. Argentina had multiple and 
occasionally conflicting interests with CHA and its more conservative, assimilationist 
goals versus the myriad other groups which eventually formed into FALGBT, pushing 
for a more difference-conscious and accomodationist set of goals. Brazil, like its political 
parties, saw a very splintered landscape of LGBT rights groups with varying approaches 
and goals, but once ABLGBTT formed via the consolidation of GGB and dozens of other 
organizations, the resources of each group could be consolidated and directed in a more 
precise and streamlined fashion. Conversely, countries such as Peru or Venezuela may 
have several activist groups present, but their success has been limited relative to those 
with longer-standing and consolidated social movements. We should expect a significant 
positive correlation between movement consolidation and policy success.   
 
Institutional Factors 
H4: Greater presidential support for LGBT rights initiatives will correlate positively with 
successful passage whereas greater shares of a legislature with  
distinctly right-wing parties will correlate negatively. 
 As far as the structure and functioning of government is concerned, much of the 
likelihood of success revolves around the ability of political parties in government to 
rally around specific pieces of legislation in general and LGBT-oriented policies – a 
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relatively niche policy area – in particular. This is measured in terms of party discipline, 
and this can be assessed on the relative uniformity of votes for prior legislation among  
members of the same party. Conversely, if parties are weak and heavily fragmented, it 
will be much more difficult to convince legislators to coalesce around bills for such niche 
causes as LGBT rights. 
 Party discipline – the relative cohesion of legislatures within their given political 
party – is relatively weak in Brazil. There is little in the way of party identification 
among votes and as such, the political party to which a legislator belongs is perhaps 
surprisingly non-predictive of how one will vote on most given issues. (Amex, 2002) 
While parties do tend to have identifiable and distinct ideological centers, they tend to be 
rather broad. The issues stem from a combination of using open-list proportional 
representation, high-magnitude electoral districts, lack of term limits, and state-level 
candidate selection. In addition, given the broadly haphazard nature of the Brazilian  
Congress, Presidents face a persistent and significant difficulty in pushing their measures 
through. However, party unity tends to increase substantially when rewards and 
punishments wielded by party leaders are sufficiently strong, and this varies on a case-by-
case basis. Aside from the clout of party leaders, the cooperation of legislators with their 
parties is a function of (A) their stance among voters, and (B) the geographic 
concentration of their voting base. With this, we can hypothesize that niche interests such 
as LGBT rights are so difficult to pass through the legislature in that support tends to 
come from major coastal cities in which these criteria are fulfilled, and those represent a 
minority of Brazilian districts. 
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State commitment in Brazil has been sustained for the most part, as evidenced by 
the outspokenness of former Brazilian president Luiz Lula da Silva. On June 5, 2008, he 
addressed the First National Conference of Gays, Lesbians, Bisexuals, Transvestites, and 
Transsexuals to unequivocally state his support for LGBT rights, conspicuously framing 
his support in a broader civil rights context. For instance, he exclaimed that, “[N]obody 
questions your sexual orientation when you pay your income tax, nobody questions it 
when you pay any tribute in this country. Why dsicriminate when you, freely, choose 
what you want to do with your body?” (pp. 268). In this sense, the speech seemed to 
make an assimilationist assumption. Later on, he stated that, 
You know what I felt when I put this [LGBT rights-affirming] hat on my head, Tony? 
The same prejudice I felt against me when I put on the Homeless Movement hat. I had 
never been scolded so harshly. I was the newly elected president of the republic, and I put 
the Homeless Movement hat on my head. I was scolded in the press for I think a month. I 
could have put on the Bank of Brazil hat, the Real Bank hat, the Bradesco hat, the Vale 
do Rio Doce hat, the Petrobras hat, the Corinthians hat, the Flamengo hat, the Vasco hat, 
I could have chosen any of them…Now, I could not put on the Homeless [Movement] 
hat, and I saw a light: I will put them all on, because only like this can I break the 
prejudices that people have of thinking what you can and cannot do. 
(Lula, pp. 268)  
 
In this vein, Lula strongly suggests that LGBT rights are essentially another form of civil 
rights, comparing it to the rights of homeless people – another notable issue in Brazil 
given the children’s rights movement which had developed in response to the military 
government shooting vagrant children to death. The final quote of this speech worth 
pointing to is, “It is a shame [that there were not more senators and deputies at the 
conference] because, upon seeing you, they would be surprised, and would make the 
exclamation: ‘They are the same as me.’” (p. 269). This concluding remark demonstrates  
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a framing of LGBT issues as a much broader struggle for basic human rights. The speech 
more generally helps demonstrate the peculiar commitment of the Brazilian state to 
LGBT rights causes. 
 The Argentinian Congress has a notably cohesive and disciplined two-party 
structure, one of the reasons of which stems from the fact that elected officials by and 
large tend to follow very party-oriented paths to office, i.e. via a gubernatorial or 
presidential appointment, or a lower elected office (Jones, 2002). Much of the discipline 
stems from the rules governing elections and legislation, perhaps most notable among 
them being the committee system. Some committees, such as the budgetary or foreign 
affairs committees, allow for great steering and clout whereas others such as the culture 
or disability committees tend to offer less of this. The proverbial kingmakers in this 
process are party leaders, which mean there exists a very high cost of defection. Further, 
the Peronists of the Justicialist tradition faced deep persecution during the junta years of 
the 1970s and early 1980s, thereby cultivating a deep sense of identity and subsequent 
loyalty among their ranks. With respect to the position of party leaders – the role of 
which is assumed by the President for whichever party he or she belongs to – can help 
explain the success of same-sex marriage legislation in Argentina, particularly as 
President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner was an outspoken advocate by the time the bill 
came to a vote. This, combined with the Justicialists’ majority in Congress, was in large 
part what pushed that bill through in the end.  
 Finally, as per Londregan (2002) with respect to Chile, the Senate is unique 
among legislative chambers both within and outside Latin America in that there is a panel 
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of seats reserved for appointed legislators who were appointed by the outgoing Pinochet 
regime in the early 1990s. In a study examining the homogeneity of these eight or nine 
appointed seats vs. the remaining 38 seats which are elected, Londregan found virtually 
no correlation which suggested the existence of a bipolar (two-party system) model, nor 
which suggested homogeneity among preferences of appointed Senators. There is 
debatably a very loose pair of coalitions which forms a de facto two-party system, but if 
there is, “party” discipline is very limited – more akin to that seen in Brazil rather than in 
Argentina. Given these developments, it is difficult to say why the status of LGBT rights 
legislation is where it is (very limited to nonexistent), but we might preliminarily 
hypothesize that similar problems persist as those in the Brazilian legislature. Niche 
issues such as LGBT rights would have a difficult time passing through such a system, 
and the fact that the democratic transition took place later on in Chile may also serve as a 
hindrance. 
 In essence, we would do well to account for the institutional framework within 
which laws are crafted and delivered. A relatively niche issue such as protections 
specifically for LGBT individuals and/or families can only be expected to pass legislative 
chambers composed of strong coalitions that can foster agreement within their ranks. The 
judiciary needs to be accounted for as well in light of the fact that same-sex unions have 
been granted legal status through that branch of government in Brazil and Colombia. This 
proceeds to tie I with the constitutional language hypothesis, thought there is some 
circumstantial evidence that the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court ruled as it did courtesy 
of President Lula having appointed a majority of its judges by that point in time (de Santa 
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Cruz, Jardim & Garoupa, 2011). Beyond that, it is difficult in this context to analyze 
judicial behavior in a manner often executed in studies of American politics in light of 
scarce data.   
 
LGBT Rights Opposition 
H5: Closer ties between church and state, along with an influx of Evangelical Protestant 
lobbying tends to impede the progress of LGBT rights in a country.  
Broadly speaking, the Catholic Church, standing in contradistinction from the 
Protestant churches of the nearby former British colonies of the Caribbean, tends to be 
viewed as a cultural institution rather than a rigid and concrete one. As such, Catholic 
leaders have by and large had less concrete impact on policy within Latin American 
countries relative to their Protestant counterparts in the British Caribbean (Wilets, 2010). 
Given the heavily Roman Catholic nature of the continent, it stands to reason that a 
majority of lawmakers and judges are at least nominally of the Catholic faith. 
Interestingly, although the Catholic Church has been the most outspoken, visible, and 
obvious opponent of such policy measures as same-sex marriage and anti-discrimination 
statutes, it has seen little success in actually stemming the tide of LGBT rights. While 
there were successful blocks or delays in Venezuela (Merentes, 2000), the Argentine 
judiciary (Schulenberg, 2012), and Chile (Núñez González, 2010), they ultimately failed 
in the countries that have seen the most substantial progress. As Goldfrank and Rowell 
(2012) point out, Church leaders in states with little regard for secularity have been the 
most reluctant to speak out against state abuses. Conversely, Church leaders in more 
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historically secular Latin American states have tended to be the most vocal in their 
condemnation of human rights abuses by their governments. Argentina is perhaps the 
best example of the former, with Uruguay representative of the latter. In the context of 
states passing anti-LGBT laws, we might expect the Argentinian Catholic Church to be 
among the most vocal in attempting to derail pro-LGBT legislation or rulings prior to its 
passage, but then to stand on the proverbial sidelines once it has passed. Much the 
opposite should be expected in Uruguay. 
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CHAPTER V 
 VARIABLE SELECTION FOR HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
 
 Given that the purpose of this study is to introduce a systematic empirical analysis 
of the process of LGBT rights development in South American, and specifically to 
explore why there exists a disparity between the countries of the region in this respect, we 
will need to carefully define the dependent variable – the enactment of LGBT rights 
policies – as carefully as possible. Following that, we can proceed to select which 
independent and control variables should prove most relevant in painting the picture we 
are looking for in the process.  
 
Establishing the Scope of Jurisdiction 
 In an effort to effectively control for as many background factors as possible, we 
will need to narrow the scope of countries selected to a relatively homogeneous region in 
terms of religious traditions, socioeconomic status, and colonial history. Given these 
initial parameters, coupled with the focus on Latin America generally, the most prudent 
scope of analysis would likely be the ten countries on the South American continent. 
Mexico, Central America, and the Latin American Caribbean nations are fundamentally 
distinct from the South American nations demographically, as well as in terms of size and  
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recent history. Further and perhaps more pertinent is that there are a number of 
integration efforts such as the MERCOSUR common market scheme in which the South 
American countries have attempted to form a multinational block akin to the European 
Union, meaning there is more economic and political integration on the continent apart 
from the remainder of Latin America. Finally, the practical issues of data availability, 
time, and status ambiguity dictate that not every country in the region may be realistically  
integrated into this study.6 As a result, the jurisdictional units of analysis fall to the ten 
Latin American countries in South America, which is to say every country except 
Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana.  
 With this case selection, we can also ensure that level of economic development, 
public opinion with respect to most LGBT rights initiatives, and whether or status as a 
democracy are held constant. As Corrales (2014) pointed out, there is little reason to 
believe that economic development status has any substantial impact on LGBT rights in 
this context, even though it may have in past studies within the U.S. or Europe. However, 
it may not be assumed that results from a study of this nature will necessarily apply in the 
same capacity to non-democracies or to entirely different cultures. By and large, it speaks 
to the Latin American experience and may be generalizable to the remainder of Latin 
America as long as one is careful to account for the differences in recent history and 
public opinion on this and related matters. An attempt to generalize this to Eastern 
Europe – which has a roughly parallel recent history of emerging from decades of 
authoritarianism and very low trust in political institutions – the differences in religion, 
                                                          
6 For example, Cuba is highly authoritarian and thus has very unreliable official data on even basic  
demographic characteristics; Puerto Rico is not an independent country but is part of the U.S., etc.  
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political culture, and intra-regional dynamics will likely be confounding to the point of 
yielding unreliable analysis 
 
Dependent Variable7 
 As noted earlier, there needs to be more than one specific policy under 
examination in order to determine the full nature of LGBT rights, meaning we must not, 
for example, examine only same-sex marriage or civil union legislation, as is common in 
other literature on the subject. Given that protection from non-state actors is no less 
crucial for comprehensive LGBT rights as is recognition of unions and other rights by the 
state, it is important to include such measures as anti-discrimination legislation as well.8 
As such, this study will take into account factors going into the enactment of same-sex 
marriage, civil unions, anti-discrimination policies, joint adoption laws, and whether or 
not one can serve while openly LGBT in the military.9 In an effort to capture the full 
extent of the momentum that exists in each country, it will be vital to not account not 
only for those policies which have successfully been implemented, but those which have 
surfaced and advanced partially through the legislature or courts. Thus, if a bill was at 
least introduced in one chamber but blocked shortly thereafter, it will be accounted for as 
                                                          
7 For further details on variable coding and sourcing, reference the appendix section. 
  
8 There may be some contention with the treatment of all four policies as identical, but for our purposes, it 
will likely yield the best results since same-sex marriage has so far been enacted in only three countries, 
and not until the final year of observation in two of them. 
 
9 Anti-discrimination policies include prohibitions on discrimination in employment, housing, and social 
and public services. Some variation between policies enacted depending on the country.  
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an attempt at passage, as will a circuit-level court case that proceeds to an unsuccessful 
appeal. 
 
Independent Variables 
 The criteria for gauging whether or not a national constitution features language 
establishing the parameters for marriage or other legal unions for the purpose of family 
formation is fairly straightforward, as is the criterion for deciding whether that language 
is specifically gendered. The text of each constitution will need to be examined so as to 
weed out any potential implications for marriage or family unions, which is present in at 
least some constitutions in the region (Moreira, 2012; de la Cruz, 2013). It should be 
noted that unlike most constitutions, those of Latin American countries tend to be 
unusually detailed and lengthy, often establishing positive rights such as access to 
minimal levels of health care and education. As such, there are unusual features within 
these constitutions, including at times the inclusion of regulations and rights surrounding 
the formation of families and/or legal unions.  
 Because the realization of minority rights in general seldom happen absent 
concerted effort on the part of interest groups relentlessly pushing for policies protecting 
them or otherwise establishing laws which allow for the fulfillment of their basic rights, it 
is paramount to determine the role that social movements have played in the enactment of 
LGBT rights policies in South America. Traditionally, data on the net wealth of 
organizations have been used (Haider-Markel & Meier, 1996; Haider-Markel, 2001), but 
such has proven too impractical for this study. In lieu of measuring the overall wealth of 
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the LGBT rights organizations within each country, we will track the number of reported 
movements in each country for each year studied, and examine whether consolidation has 
taken place. The act of consolidation can serve as a stand-in for the overall resource 
mobilization and professionalism of a country’s social movement groups, even if it is an 
indirect or imperfect measure (Schulenberg, 2010; Piatti-Crocker, 2010; Schulenberg, 
2012). The main rationale for this stems from the fact that groups that have formed from 
the splicing of previously splintered movements will likely have had more time to 
develop and will thus be more sophisticated on the whole.  
 On a related note, we will also capture HIV/AIDS-related efforts in each country 
by examining the number of groups present in each country as well as discerning whether 
or not the country in question has established an HIV/AIDS-targeting government 
agency. Because of its initial status a predominantly homosexual disease, coupled with 
the fact that LGBT rights groups have often asserted AIDS-related causes as top 
priorities, it can serve as a useful metric for the overall LGBT interest group activity 
taking place in a given country. On a more practical level, the data for such is widely and 
publicly available. This broad-based approach should provide the most in-depth analysis 
feasible, given available data.  
 Conventional wisdom holds that left-leaning parties should prove more amenable 
to LGBT rights and otherwise relatively liberal positions on social issues generally, while 
the converse should be true of right-leaning parties. Initial research on the matter in South 
American countries (Brown, 2002; Frasca, 2005; Merentes, 2008; Piatti-Crocker, 2010; 
Schulenberg, 2010) suggests that this is not necessarily the case. The socialist 
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governments of Venezuela and Bolivia have seen minimal support or prioritization of 
LGBT issues, for example. Conversely, the right-leaning former president of Chile, 
Sebastián Piñera, openly supported same-sex marriage nationwide there in 2006 (Estrada, 
2006). In light of this, it would be prudent to pinpoint those parties whose platforms or 
histories suggest social conservatism in particular. Parties that are broadly center-right 
but specify market liberalism, free trade, or globalization as the key drivers of their 
platforms will not necessarily qualify as right-leaning for the purposes of this study.  
 Further, because presidents tend to be so powerful and influential in Latin 
American countries, largely as a legacy of Cold War-era military juntas, it will be worth 
capturing the stance of the president on legislative matters. We have seen, for instance, 
that the president serves a very influential role in rallying support among partisans in 
Argentina (Schulenberg, 2012), though this influence varies by country. Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva of Brazil was among the most vocal supporters of same-sex unions to date, for 
example, but little progress has been seen there on the legislative front due at least in part 
to lax party discipline. On aggregate, however, there is reason to suspect that a positive 
trend in presidential support and legislative success will be present, given other favorable 
conditions.  
 Finally, because so many LGBT rights successes have emerged from the 
judiciary, it is important to capture the as many relevant court cases, at least on the 
federal level, as possible. As such, each court case will effectively count as an attempt to 
pass legislation, though it is to be counted separately given the dynamics unique to 
judicial decisionmaking.    
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 As noted prior, an overwhelming majority of opposition to LGBT rights comes 
from religious leaders and organizations. While every country under examination is 
overwhelmingly Catholic, there are some other variables that show change country-by-
country. One is the proportion of Protestants, which has grown rapidly throughout the 
region in recent years to the point that it has become a substantial majority with an ability 
to sway politics by forming electoral blocs. This has been most notable in Brazil but the 
Protestant and evangelical growth has been visible across the entirety of Latin America 
and much of the rest of the developing world (“Hola, Luther,” 2008; “Brazil’s Changing 
Religious Landscape,” 2013). Further, because federal-level anti-discrimination 
legislation has been blocked by a bloc of evangelical legislators, it stands to reason that a 
relationship can be expected to exist between the influence of these leaders and blockage 
of LGBT rights legislation.  
 More broadly speaking, religiosity – the level of influence that religion has in 
one’s life – is often used as a related predictor in attempting to determine the palatability 
of LGBT rights issues (Haider-Markel & Meier, 1996; Haider-Markel, 2001). This refers 
not to which specific religion respondents adhere, but how great a role religion plays in 
one’s everyday life. The well-respected polling firm Gallup maintains a semi-annual 
global report on these numbers. We should expect for greater religiosity to correlate 
negatively with success in passage of LGBT rights policies. In addition, the religiosity 
measure may arguably serve as a stand-in for the influence of the Catholic Church in a 
given country, given the overwhelming Catholic tilt of the region in general.  
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CHAPTER VI  
ANALYSIS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
As alluded to prior, there exists a wide disparity in LGBT protections across the 
South American region, though there has been substantial progress in most countries 
within the past decade or so. This study will count five distinct policies as signaling 
greater respect for LGBT rights on the part of the state: Same-sex marriage, same-sex 
civil unions, laws barring discrimination in the workplace, laws allowing same-sex 
couples to jointly adopt children, and allowing LGBT soldiers to serve openly in the 
military. Below is a chart of the ten countries under examination and the laws, if enacted, 
with the year during which they were enacted. 
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Table 1  
LGBT Rights-affirming Policies by Country and Year of Enactment 
Country Marriage Civil 
Unions 
A-D 
Law 
Joint 
Adoption 
Open 
Service 
         
ARG 
2010 2010 - 2010 2009 
         
BOL 
- - 2009 - - 
         
BRZ 
2013 2011 - 2010 1988* 
         
CHI 
- - 2012 - 1998** 
         
COL 
- 2007 2011 - 1999 
         
ECU 
- 2008 1997 - 1997 
         
PAR 
- - - - - 
         
PER 
- - - - 2009 
         
URU 
2013 2009 2004 2009 2009 
         
VEN 
- - - - 1999 
 
 *1988 constitution bars discrimination, which has been interpreted as including the barring of anti-LGBT             
   discrimination for military service.  
 ** Sodomy was decriminalized in 1998, and there was never an official ban on open military service.  
As of 2014, at least some action has been taken in all but one of the countries 
under examination, with three having gone as far as enacting full same-sex marriage on a 
nationwide basis. In addition to the policy results noted in the descriptive statistics, 
numerous unsuccessful efforts have been made prior to the passage of successful LGBT 
rights-affirming policies. In many cases, as with same-sex unions in Venezuela or anti-
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discrimination laws in Brazil, there has yet to be any concrete policy success on a 
nationwide level.  
 
Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
          Language .69 .856 
          Federal .22 .417 
          Consolidation .16 .365 
 HIV/AIDS Agency .10 .301 
      HIV/AIDS Groups 1.40 .92 
        Right-wing Share 32.38% 18.35% 
          Pres. Support  .26 .349 
          Protestant % 10.65% 4.29% 
          Secularity 2.95 1.034 
 
 A cursory observation of the mean scores for each variable show us that the 
aggregate favorability within national constitutions in South America shows substantial  
favorability, with the mean score showing over two-thirds of the relevant constitutional 
text to be favorable versus unfavorable to judicial recognition of same-sex unions. 
Approximately one-third of the legislative composition over this time period consisted of 
identifiably right-wing parties. The proportion of Protestants across the region has grown 
to more than ten percent, thereby suggesting a rapidly building clout within regional 
politics. 
 Before proceeding, it is important to distinguish between the date of successful 
passage and the number of attempts seen in a country through either lawsuit or 
legislation. Some of the countries that have seen the most attempts to date have seen 
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minimal progress, while others that saw a critical enactments earlier on, meaning there 
were fewer attempts needed for progress to take place. Figure 1 illustrates this 
phenomenon.  
 
 
Figure 1. Cumulative Attempts at Passage of LGBT Rights Initiatives, 2000-2013. 
 
  
 This graph shows that, for instance, significant action has been taken in 
Venezuela, though this is at least in part because there has yet to be a significant LGBT 
rights policy passed on the federal level. Thus, a high number of attempts does not 
necessarily equate to progress and vice versa, given the early success of anti-
discrimination law codified in the 1998 constitution. Nevertheless, countries such as 
Uruguay and Argentina have seen enactment of full same-sex marriage, whereas 
Paraguay has seen no progress of the sort concerned here to date.  
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Methodology 
 This analysis will take the form of an event-history analysis, specifically via a 
Cox regression. EHA proves particularly useful for diffusion research in that it 
incorporates a time variable, thereby allowing one to account for intra-observation 
variation over the course of a study’s time frame. In essence, an EHA follows a series of 
observations which are arranged in timed blocks, following that observation block up to 
the point at which the event occurs. For each time unit within the observation block that 
lies before the event, the unit is coded with a 0. When the event occurs, it is coded with a 
1, after which point the observation block “dies,” or falls out of the dataset. Another term 
applied to EHA is proportional hazards model or survival analysis in light of the fact that 
it measures rate at which the unit of analysis survives within the dataset before covariates 
lead it to drop out.   
In comparison with binary and probit models, for instance, there is an inherent 
advantage in that it takes the history and context surrounding a phenomenon into account 
as opposed to merely reporting whether the event occurred or not. In addition, there is an 
advantage over the use of ordinary least-squares regression (OLS) models in that it 
avoids data truncation by accounting for the time at which the observations begin taking 
shape and, if ongoing indefinitely, accounts for observations happening afterwards. When 
data observations occur outside of this time frame in an OLS model, one must make 
arbitrary assumptions that events begin and end at times when they have not, and this can 
in turn lead to bias. EHA corrects for such likely bias by censoring data points from the 
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set of observations rather than effectively pretending as though they never happened or 
have prematurely ended (Box-Steffensmeier & Woo, 2011).  
In the case of this analysis, the dependent variable will consist of actions taken 
which ultimately lead up to a critical action that has been taken by the state in question. 
Once the critical action occurs, all subsequent observations for that particular country 
will drop from the data set, as it has “died” in the sense that the chief occurrence – 
enactment of a major LGBT rights initiative on the federal level – has occurred and thus 
no further observations are warranted. The factors of interest are: The coefficient (B), a 
positive number showing increased risk of adoption and a decreased period of time prior 
to critical action; the standard error (SE), and the hazard ratio (Exp(B)), which denotes 
the ratio of hazards between two countries when all other variables are held constant. For 
example, if a the right-wing party share variable has a coefficient of .15, then the hazard 
rate or risk of adoption increases by 15% with each unit increase in right-wing 
representation in that given country’s legislature. The log likelihood and chi-square are 
the two remaining numbers of interest in a cox regression. The former tests for whether 
or not the addition of a variable adds to the likelihood that the event will occur, with a 
lower number tending to correlate with the addition of more variables due to the use in a 
proportional hazards model of a negative log likelihood. The chi-square tests the 
hypothesis that all coefficients used in the model are identical and equal to zero, with 
higher numbers suggesting a better overall fit given the relative lack of deviance between 
coefficients (Box-Steffensmeier & Woo, 2011). 
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Application of the Methodology 
 The data for this analysis consists of 140 state-years – 10 states over the course of 
14 years, spanning from 2000 to 2013.10 The commencement of the time scale was 
difficult to solidify, but because that decade is when a vast majority of actions have taken 
place, it is ultimately prudent and non-arbitrary. The states under analysis were chosen, as 
noted previously, because they are relatively homogeneous when it comes to several key 
factors ranging from colonial history to linguistics to political culture, thereby allowing 
us to effectively control for them.11 Because most states under examination have taken at 
least some action in the realm of LGBT rights as of 2013, there should be little concern 
that excessive censoring of cases will occur. 
 For purposes of clarification, the intention is to analyze the following: The events 
(attempts at passage of a law or a court ruling) are counted if and until the critical action 
(passage, enactment, or ruling) takes place, while those units of observation (countries) 
that have seen attempts without success remain “at risk” and should be considered likely 
candidates for such passage in the future. However, even if there has been no action taken 
in a given country, then there is still a chance that it can happen, even though it is less 
likely. The results of the Cox regression are shown in Table 3.  
 This analysis runs a total of five models. Model 1 focuses on attempts to win 
rights (particularly same-sex union recognition) through the judiciary, observing the 
                                                          
10 Because of the nature of an event-history analysis, a number of observations, particularly later in the time 
scale, are dropped once the critical action for that country takes place. Thus, the total number of 
observations amounts to 110.  
11 Venezuela has been included as a control variable, given its unique political and particularly legislative 
composition during this time frame.  
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impact of social movements and secularity of the government. Model 2 focuses on the 
impact of extra-governmental groups from both sides of the issue, including the social 
movement variables as well as the trend in Protestantism within the given countries. 
Model 3 attempts to discern the impact of religious groups, postulating a negative 
correlation in this case. Model 4 intends to focus on the impacts of the legislature, with 
another postulated negative correlation given higher degrees of right-wing composition. 
Finally, Model 5 includes all variables for a thorough multivariate analysis.  
 
Results 
Table 3  
Factors Influencing State Action on LGBT Rights 
Variable 
 
Model 1 
B 
(Std. 
Err.) 
Exp.(B) 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Language 
 
.520* 
(.214) 
1.681 
- 
.838*** 
(.198) 
2.312 
- 
1.133*** 
(1.405) 
3.924 
 
 
Federal 
 
- - - 
-.568 
(1.071) 
.567 
1.367 
(1.405) 
3.924 
 
Consolidation 
 
1.977** 
(.682) 
7.219 
-.060 
(.591) 
.941 
- 
.558 
(1.132) 
1.747 
.759 
(1.138) 
2.136 
 
 
HIV/AIDS 
Agency 
 
-1.928* 
(.816) 
.145 
.663 
(.598) 
1.941 
- 
.701 
(.598) 
2.015 
-.414 
(1.074) 
.661 
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N=110, *P<.05 **P<.01 ***P<.001.  
            
 
 
 
HIV/AIDS 
Groups 
 
1.158*** 
(.314) 
3.184 
-.042 
(.146) 
.959 
- 
-.017 
(.145) 
.983 
1.560*** 
(.365) 
4.760 
 
 
Right-wing 
Share 
 
- 
-.019* 
(.009) 
.981 
-.017 
(.009) 
.983 
-.018 
(.010) 
.982 
.016 
(.013) 
1.016 
 
 
Pres. Support 
 
- - - 
-.276 
(.339) 
.759 
-.723 
(.423) 
.485 
 
 
Protestant % 
 
- 
-.141*** 
(.027) 
.869 
-.166*** 
(.040) 
.847 
- 
-.262*** 
(.050) 
.769 
 
 
Secularity 
 
 
1.291*** 
(.353) 
3.637 
 
- 
 
-.035 
(.204) 
.965 
 
 
- 
1.517** 
(.452) 
4.561 
Venezuela - 
-.392 
(.460) 
.676 
-.023 
(.464) 
.977 
.112 
(1.053) 
.011 
-.356 
(1.242) 
.701 
 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
539.490 554.344 528.504 552.993 495.474 
 
X2 
 
24.329 12.074 37.739 13.341 75.075 
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The constitutional language (H1) hypothesis is strongly supported, while the 
social movements (H3) institutional (H4), and (H5) hypotheses are supported with caveats; 
and the federalism (H2) hypothesis has little empirical support. The federalism hypothesis 
likely failed to show much in the way of significance in light of the fact that there were 
delays in such federal republics as Brazil and Argentina relative to other countries under 
examination in adopting a substantial LGBT rights policy. This in turn may have 
stemmed from the observed effects of religious groups, both Protestant and Catholic. 
Further, because of the unusual political situation in Venezuela given the distinctly 
socialist government seen under the late president Hugo Chavez, there was ultimately 
reason to control for it in the analysis. Because Venezuela is the remaining federal 
republic, the results for this variable were likely skewed further in the direction opposite 
what was predicted. As far as the support of the president is concerned, there was no 
apparent relationship for similar reasons that the federalism hypothesis proved less than 
explanatory.  
 The social movement variables showed cursory significance, and it may have 
been stronger had the data gathered for its inclusion been less crude. Notably, the first  
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model, which focuses on the judicial process of achieving same-sex unions, there is 
considerable significance, thereby suggesting that there has so far been the more 
productive route to take. The constitutional language variable, it is worth noting, showed 
significance in this realm as well, as should be expected. Because the first substantial 
action taken in three of the seven countries which ultimately did was done through the 
judiciary, constitutional application would likely prove very relevant. The variable 
measuring Protestantism showing significance is hardly a surprise, since the largest 
growth in evangelical Protestantism has occurred mainly in Brazil and Chile, and the first 
substantial pro-LGBT policy enactments there were at least somewhat delayed relative to 
other countries. The church-state relationship variable appears explanatory in two of the 
three models in which it was employed, thereby suggesting that it plays some role in 
quickening the pace of adoption. This was observed in the case study for Argentina 
wherein the high court reversed the ruling of a lower court in Buenos Aires arguing for 
same-sex unions, citing specifically Catholic precedent. The share of a legislature that is 
identifiably right-wing appears to impede progress when social movement actions are 
taken into account, as per the second model, but not in any other case. This is to be 
expected, since the legislature has much more discretion in how to respond to these 
groups than do the courts.   
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CHAPTER VIII 
LIMITATIONS 
 
 One of the most notable limitations of this research is that there is little ability to 
distinguish between the actions of courts versus those taken by legislatures. While the 
inclusion of constitutional language and political party variables allows for some analysis 
of their effects, it still remains unclear as per the data utilized in this study as to which 
branch of government was responsible for the first substantial policy step. Another point 
of contention likely stems from the lack of available data on the wealth and resource 
distribution (Haider-Markel & Meier, 1996) of LGBT organizations in each country, it 
proved difficult to gauge their impact. An alternative method of measuring the 
proliferation of LGBT rights organizations in a country would be to simply record the 
number of active groups, but this is exceedingly difficult when attempting to measure the 
effects of each variable over a period of time. It was for this reason that the number of 
HIV/AIDS groups and government agencies was used as a stand-in, though imperfect 
such a substitution is likely to be. Finally, because it was held as a constant in this case, 
the role of the Catholic Church itself cannot be discerned. However, as seen in the case of 
Argentina when appeals were struck down by the high court on explicitly Catholic 
grounds and in Venezuela when a constitutional amendment barring discrimination was  
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blocked, it has a unique influence that could stand to be distilled further. 
 Ultimately, a more robust analysis would be possible if (A) the differential 
impacts of legislative vs. judicial decisionmaking, and (B) social movements are 
incorporated more thoroughly into the data such as the nuances described in the literature 
review may be explored rather than simply gauging whether a substantial consolidation 
had occurred. This would have been much more feasible had time not been factored into 
the analysis, e.g. via execution of an ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression, but this 
would have lent itself to a host of different limitations. The time variable is key when 
measuring the influence of factors that show lagged effects, as was the case here.   
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CHAPTER IX  
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 With this study being the first rigorous, systematic, and quantitative examination 
of LGBT rights in South America, it should serve as a valuable contribution to the small 
albeit rapidly growing body of literature on the subject. There are nevertheless some 
serious limitations which pave the way for more comprehensive research on the matter in 
the future. Given the limitation inherent in a crude dummy coding for a phenomenon with 
as much nuance and fine-grained detail as social movements, future researchers would 
undoubtedly do well to investigate these nuances and political dynamics within each 
country so as to better determine the factors which drive both the discourse and policy 
processes with respect to LGBT rights in South America. Much the same should be said 
of research on pro-LGBT social movements within the region. Moving beyond a single 
region, more ambitious future researchers may apply the lessons of South America to 
other developing regions in Africa or Asia. Granted, the unique political cultures, 
histories, and other factors will provide challenges for this approach, but given the dire 
state of LGBT rights in most of these regions, there is reason to pursue such research. 
One other major aspect of LGBT rights in South America revolves around the influence 
of the global community and its burgeoning influence in this realm (Friedman, 2012; de  
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la Cruz, 2013). As such, a more rigorous examination of its effects may be examined as 
such events unfold, as they are evidently significant albeit very difficult to examine 
systematically. 
 It must be emphasized that, aside from the quantitative results from this, there is 
at least some qualitative evidence within the literature examined to suggest a more robust 
relationship. From a practical standpoint, if the successes seen in the countries examined 
here are to be replicated in other countries or even in entirely different regions of the 
world, then it stands to reason that the most readily available resources to marginalized 
groups will come in the form of extra-governmental organization. While it is technically 
possible to alter constitutions or to elect relatively socially radical parties to government, 
it is a monumental task in the absence of sufficiently organized and cohesive social 
movements to spearhead such drives. As seen in the results of this analysis, success is 
most likely when pursued through the courts when there is enough of an opportunity 
available through either judicial innovation by way of influence from countries like the 
U.S., or when the constitution contains language amenable to a positive ruling. 
Nevertheless, the legislature matters as well, meaning socially conservative parties can 
impeded progress. As de la Cruz (2013) suggests, any organized groups in Latin 
America, at the very least, would do well to “follow the leader” embodied in the example 
of Spain. Groups would maximize success by establishing concrete demands for full 
marriage equality and refusing to back down for any compromise or substitute unless it 
becomes impossible to achieve, find a maximally friendly political party and push the 
agenda through via their leadership, and maneuver around the opposition by establishing 
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local-level implementations so as to demonstrate the real impacts of such laws so as to 
assuage the need for idle speculation. 
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APPENDIX 
VARIABLE MEASUREMENT AND DATA SOURCES 
 
Variable Measurement Source 
Critical Action 
A cumulative categorical 
variable that will account 
for each attempt up to the 
point of adoption of one of 
four key policies, 
whichever is adopted fist. 
Attempts will be dummy 
coded 0 for lack of an 
attempt or passage, and 1 
for an attempt or passage 
with all subsequent 
observations for that 
country falling from the 
data set. 
 
Various sources listed 
in the References 
section. Mostly culled 
from Wikipedia-
directed sources which 
show proper 
documentation. 
Language 
A categorical variable 
measuring conduciveness 
to pro-LGBT interpretation. 
0 represents least 
conducive (recognition of 
families mentioned, 
gendered language), 1 (No 
recognition of families 
mentioned), and 2 
(Recognition of families, 
non-gendered language). 
The constitution of 
each country 
examined, found 
through 
<http://www.wipo.int/
wipolex/en/> 
 
Federal 
Dummy coded 0 for unitary 
states and 1 for federal. 
CIA World Factbook: 
<https://www.cia.gov/l
ibrary/publications/the
-world-factbook/> 
Consolidation 
Dummy coded 0 for those 
countries having seen no 
consolidation of their social 
Brown, 2002; Piatti-
Crocker, 2010; 
Shulenberg, 2010; 
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movements and 1 for those 
that have. 
 
Shulenberg, 2012; 
Bonomo, 2013; de la 
Cruz, 2013. LGBT 
organizations listed in 
Griego, 2008. 
HIV/AIDS 
Agency 
Dummy coded 0 for lack of 
a government agency 
dedicated to dissemination 
resources, 1 for countries 
that do have such an 
agency. 
 
Griego, 2008. 
HIV/AIDS 
Groups 
Number of HIV/AIDS 
organizations active in a 
given country. 
 
Organizations listed in 
Griego, 2008. 
Right-wing 
Share 
Proportion of a legislature 
composed of distinctly 
right-wing political parties, 
particularly in the social 
realm. 
 
Various entries on 
national legislative 
elections, culled from 
<http://www.politicaen
elmundo.com/> 
Pres. Support 
Dummy coded 0 for lack of 
apparent support from a 
sitting president for at least 
one major LGBT rights 
initiative, and 1 for when 
such support is evident. 
 
Lula, 2008; 
Schulenberg, 2012. 
Church-State 
Relationship 
Categorical variable coded 
0 to 2, with zero showing 
tightest relationship 
between church and state 
and 2 showing the most 
secularity. 
Constitutions of 
respective countries 
analyzed. 
